IOZ says:

[T]he plainer truth of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is that it represents and clearly indicates that gays aren’t fighting for the right to “defend their country,” but are fighting for the right to go forth and kill foreigners in aggressive, hegemonic foreign wars, invasions, and occupations.

I am sympathetic, but I think we ought to be careful. I think most opponents of DADT are fighting for gays’ right to “defend their country.” It just turns out that much of the U.S. military’s actual activity is “to go forth and kill foreigners in aggressive, hegemonic foreign wars, invasions, and occupations.” Joining the Army to defend America is sort of like joining the World Bank to help the world’s poor. You’re probably making it worse. It is difficult, however, to decide how much blame we should lay upon those who willingly turn themselves over to the violent branches of state to do its largely immoral bidding. I don’t want to say that sincerely believing that one has enlisted to defend America absolves one of responsibility for the crimes one subsequently commits under orders. It’s not like trespassing, kidnapping, and murder aren’t trespassing, kidnapping and murder just as long as a nation-state is paying you to do it. But, at the same time, it really doesn’t seem fair to lay too much on 20 year-olds inhabiting a hyper-patriotic culture in which movie trailers make the Marines look awesome and the nobility of military service is rarely questioned. Contracting to do what the military tells you to do is a moral mistake we admire and enthusiastically encourage. To refuse this encouragement and admiration to the openly gay is to do wrong unjustly. Establishing equality of status within morally compromised institutions has the virtue of one mistake over two.

Today is Ayn Rand’s birthday! What better way to celebrate than to apply the cold light of reason to her philosophy?

Below is a cleaned-up version of an email I sent to the participants in this month’s Cato Unbound on Rand’s moral and political thought in an attempt to stir the pot a bit.  When Doug Rasmussen wrote a post replying to my pot-stirring, I realized it would be helpful to readers to see just what it is that he is replying to. So here you have it…

As the discussion at Cato Unbound has developed, it has become fairly clear that Douglas Rasmussen, Neera Badhwar, and Roderick Long all share a similar neo-Aristotelian interpretation of Rand’s ethics. Or perhaps “reconstruction” would be a better term. In any case, it seems fairly clear to me that this form of eudaimonist virtue ethics, however attractive it may be, simply was not Rand’s stated theory. The theory she stated in “The Objectivist Ethics” is ambiguous between the “survival” and “flourishing” interpretation. But her later (more mature?) essay, “Causality and Duty” isn’t ambiguous at all. It is perhaps the most adamant brief for rationality-as-instrumental and morality-as-prudence ever written.

Back when I was a grad student and an Objectivist, I found the squishy Aristotelian flourishing types incredibly frustrating. (I say “squishy” with love.) “Can they read!?” I’d shout at my computer screen incredulously. Now that I find what I take to be Rand’s moral theory simply implausible, I find the squishy Aristotelian flourishing types admirably charitable. But I still consider the neo-Aristotelian line a revisionist interpretation or rational reconstruction. Is it really helpful to posterity to represent Rand as a laissez faire Bill Bennett?

Let me say a little something about one reason I drifted away from Rand. Starting from a morality-as-rationality, rationality-as-instrumental-to-survival interpretation of Rand (the interpretation obviously supported by the relevant texts!), I started to find contractarian theorists of morality-as-instrumental rationality, such as David Gauthier, pretty interesting. And through Gauthier (and James Buchanan) I came to better grasp the deep problem involved in getting just two instrumentally rational individuals to cooperate and capture the valuable surplus therefrom. It then occurred to me that there really may be a point after all in talking about morality as an institution separate from prudence. And that’s when I abandoned Randian egoism for David Schmidtzean “moral dualism” (a convenient half-way house for recovering non-neo-Aristotelian Randians). The rest is history!

Anyway, the point isn’t my intellectual biography. The point is that Rand seems to me to have missed something totally fundamental to morality: a concern for it’s social, coordinating function. The well-known social dilemmas that emerge from what Deidre McCloskey usefully calls a “Prudence Only” view of human behavior draws our attention to the need for an institution that brings separate and often conflicting interests into harmony. I don’t think there’s any denying that Rand brought much-needed attention back to the profound ethical importance of the cultivation of personal virtue in pursuit of excellence and happiness. But didn’t she sort of miss the social point of morality?

I was a bit perplexed by Clay Shirky’s piece calling for women to be more aggressive and ridiculously self-aggrandizing — to be more like men — in order to level the playing field.  Ann Friedman replies today, and I agree with her when she says:

Just as self-defense classes are not a solution to the problem of campus rape, self-advancement classes will not, on their own, improve things for women in the professional world. It will take a long time — and a lot of conscious effort — to dispel deeply ingrained stereotypes about work and gender. Women can’t do that alone. The burden also falls on people in positions of power — those who are doing the hiring, promoting, recommending, and mentoring — to understand the gender dynamics at play and to push back against them.

And I agree when she says:

This is a broad, cultural problem. If, like me, you believe that your biology is not the primary factor in determining your strengths and weaknesses in the workplace, you believe that we are shaped by the society in which we live. Which is to say, there are cultural, structural reasons why men are typically more assertive, more self-promotional, and more successful everywhere from the boardroom to the op-ed pages to the halls of Congress.

Now, I fear that Friedman may be verging a bit too close to blank-slatism here. Men do have higher concentrations of certain hormones that, other things equal, make them more aggressive than women. And there are no doubt other biological mechanisms that explain differences in the ways men and women tend to cooperate and compete. But we are thoroughly cultural creatures and I think Friedman is right that there are also “cultural, structural reasons” that explain why men and women behave differently in the workplace.

My problem with Shirky’s argument is that, assuming that men and women are wired a bit differently, and that this explains some part of observed differences in behavior and achievement, why should we ask women to be more aggressively competitive and self-promotional instead of asking men to be less so?

I think a lot of people want to say that it is simply unrealistic to ask men to chill out. Boys will be boys. And women are more pliable than men. They at least can ramp up the aggression, while competitive men will go all out no matter what. So the “everybody act like an a**hole” scenario is at least stable. And, in the end, women who otherwise would not have made it to the top will have.

First, it’s not clear to me that a new norm of more aggressively competitive women won’t encourage even more aggressively competitive men. I don’t think this would entirely prevent the greater success of a more aggressive class of women, but it may also make our professional culture even more unpleasant than it already is. Do we really want to do that?

Second, it’s not clear to me that actively stigmatizing the kind of ridiculous, overreaching self-promotion Shirky thinks is characteristic of men wouldn’t work. We want people to be “go-getters,” but we don’t want them to be obnoxious and mendacious while they try to go and get it. Why shouldn’t we tell Shirky that he should have written that guy a recommendation letter that makes it clear what an a**hole that guy is? I think he should!  Hey Clay, stop writing positive recommendation letters for self-embellishing strivers!

There are certain habits of behavior characteristic of some men clearly rooted in a desire to intimidate and assert social dominance. If the ability to intimidate and dominate — to act like an “alpha” — doesn’t have anything to do with performance at a job, then “alpha” behavior should be recognized as the unproductive social aggression that it is and accordingly discouraged through disapproval, mockery, and social and professional sanction. Decent men and women with natural talents for dominance and status competition can channel their aggressive dispositions productively by bringing them to bear on those who flout fair and productive egalitarian social norms.

And Friedman is right that those who dispense opportunities can and should become more conscious of an entrenched bias toward rewarding a certain kind of competitive zeal and can and should do more to identify and reward talented people disinclined to grasping self-puffery.

I understand that there are a good number of folks in the grip of a certain kind of vulgar pop-evo psych who will bridle at the idea of shackling the splendid blond beast. But civilization really is worth it.

I think my colleague John Samples gets it right:

The majority in Citizens United believe that the U.S. Constitution establishes a government of limited and defined powers. They asked: “Does the Constitution give government the power to prohibit speech by corporations (and others)?” The First Amendment indicated the government did not have that power.

The critics of the Citizens United decision assume the Constitution created a government of  plenary powers with limited exceptions. They recognize that free speech for individuals is one such exception. But that exception is limited to natural people, not legal constructs. If there is no exception to the plenary power of government, the critics conclude, then there is no right to speak. Congress may prohibit speech by corporations (and others).

John asks, “Which concept of the Constitution do you find most appealing?” One way to approach this question is to ask which conception of government is best suited to ensuring the security of the rights of citizens.

Here’s my best shot at articulating the position implicit in much of the progressive criticism of Citizens United…

A government that accepts that its rightful power is indeed limited along the lines of a naive reading of the First Amendment  – “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech” — will be unable to maintain the integrity of the democratic process against the undermining influence of powerful corporate interests. Since the rights and liberties of most citizens depend on an equitable democratic process, this kind of restriction on government power together with the existence of corporations is a threat to ordinary citizens’ rights and liberties. Crucially, a state that maintains the power to exercise a meaningful countervailing influence against corporate power is less of a threat to liberty than are corporations when the state has tied its own hands.

Does that sound like a fair interpretation of the progressive view?  If you think there’s something wrong with it, what is it? I think this view pretty clearly implies that the Constitution makes some profound mistakes about the sort of government required to protect citizens’ liberty. But maybe it does! So I don’t count “progs think the Constitution is flawed” as an adequate argument against this view.

Wendell Hoenir of the Objective Standard blog offers a long reply to my off-the-cuff comment the other day about Rand’s failure to show the coherence of her ethical egoism and theory of rights.

Wilkinson’s only remotely plausible objection is his allegation that Rand’s egoist has no reason to refrain from coercion because it seems as though he can profit from predation and parasitism. The example of comfortable beltway bureaucrats feeding off the public trough could lend one pause. But how are we to evaluate Wilkinson’s smug contention that these people live satisfying lives—and his implication that they would not live better lives if they were producers rather than plunderers?

Anticipating that I might point to happiness research as evidence that there are happy bureaucrats, Hoenir riffs a bit on some posts of mine about happiness research, and ends up here:

Wilkinson himself admits that we can be wrong about how happy we are. If that’s true, then we’d better not measure the self-interest of an act by the extent to which it affords us temporary material comfort or superficial self-satisfaction. Instead we must appeal to philosophic principles that measure the value of an action or policy to the life of a being who survives by reason—principles such as the virtues of independence, production, honesty, and integrity—none of which support the initiation of force.

I’m not sure what to makes of this. I’m cautiously but not profoundly skeptical about the validity of  life satisfaction self-reports. On the whole, the data suggest that places with high levels of economic and political freedom tend to be happier than those with lower levels. I think this does count as evidence that freedom is good for happiness. Not decisive evidence, but evidence.

Hoenir suggests that, instead of appealing to this kind of empirical evidence, we “appeal to philosophical principles that measure the value of an action or policy to the life of a being that survives by reason.” Hoenir says that none of these principles support the initiation of force. This sort of begs the question, doesn’t it? The question was whether an ethical egoist has sufficient reason to comply with the non-aggression principle. One can’t answer the question simply by asserting an unproven conjecture that, as a matter of fact, the pursuit of self-interest does requires strict adherence to principles that forbid non-defensive coercion. We’d need to first confirm or validate that these principles are a requirement of rational self-interest and that they forbid  the use of first force. How would we do this?

Well, Randians reject the possibility of a priori knowledge or analytic truth, as do I, so we can agree that these are empirical claims requiring empirical or inductive validation. Now, there is an emerging empirical literature in positive psychology on character strengths and virtues. My sense it is that the virtues Hoenir mentions are indeed virtues (though they are probably not defined as Hoenir would define them). However, it is not at all clear that practicing these virtues entail a refusal to initiate coercion, or to benefit from the systematic violation of classical liberal property rights.

Is it Hoenir’s claim that police officers required to initiate coercion against people involved in consensual crimes cannot, ipso facto, practice these virtues to their full extent, and therefore cannot reap the alleged benefits of doing so? Even if the police officer sincerely believes that he or she is not acting unjustly? If so, Hoenir’s theory makes a prediction: other things equal, police officers in jurisdictions with fewer laws against consensual activity are happier. Maybe it’s true! It would be interesting to find out.

How about people who do not directly coerce others, but benefit from systematic coercion? Let’s consider a story.

Ann is a bureaucrat. A political liberal, she believes in her work at HHS and finds it extremely satisfying. She is convinced that government can make the world a better place and she works hard every day to do her part making sure that it does. She can see how the program she works for helps families in need, she feels like she’s making a difference, and that’s meaningful to her. Ann has a devoted husband  (who is a lawyer for the EPA) and two delightful children. They go to church every Sunday where they learn about to importance of love for all people and the immense importance of service to others.  Of Ann’s many activities, she finds most nourishing volunteering with her children at a community soup kitchen. She’s proud of how her kids have so enthusiastically embraced their obligation to help those who need help. She’s especially proud of how they have come, like her, to value hard work, independent-mindedness, honesty, and integrity. Ann and her husband are paid well by the government, and they’re good with money. They’re very comfortable and have a terrific work-life balance. They’re also active, fit, and very healthy. Ann loves her life. She has a lot of energy, is in a good mood most of the time, has very few regrets.  When she becomes frustrated or sad, she bounces back quickly. When she reflects on her life, she is extremely grateful for everything she has.

Is Ann happy?

Of course she is. If your theory about the conditions under which people can be happy says “No,” your theory is busted.

Is this story realistic?

I think so. Washington, DC is full of people and families much like this.

I conclude that “parasitism” (i.e., living off of the proceeds of a system of state coercion) is compatible with virtue and happiness. All it really takes, I think, is believing sincerely that the system is just and that you’re doing a good thing. As long as you think you’re supporting your life “neither by robbery nor alms” and not deriving your happiness “from the injury or the favor of others,” you’re probably fine as long as the system of robbery, alms, injury, and favor is more or less stable, which ours is.

Our colloquy on Ayn Rand’s moral and political thought over at Cato Unbound continues to steam along with essays from Michael Huemer and Neera Badhwar.

Huemer lucidly sets forth the most obvious difficulty with Rand’s attempt to make the transition from ethical egoism to a strong theory of rights:

[E]thical egoism does not support the philosophy of individual rights in the first place. Quite the opposite. Take Rasmussen’s statement of the basic individualist premise: “Each individual human being is an end in him‑ or herself … not merely a means to the ends of others.” This is a very common idea in classical liberal writings. Nearly identical statements appear in Rand, in Nozick, and of course in Kant. It is also, pace Rand, directly and obviously contrary to ethical egoism. For ethical egoism posits that the only thing that ought to matter intrinsically to me is my own welfare—for me, my own welfare or happiness is the only end in itself. It follows from this that I oughtnot to regard other individuals as ends in themselves; rather, I should see them only as means to my happiness—just as I see everything else in the world. This is a very simple and straightforward implication of the theory. I cannot hold my own well-being as the only end in itself, and simultaneously say that I recognize other persons as ends in themselves too.

I think the best way to try to save Rand’s view is to emphasize, as Rod Long does in his essay, the neo-Aristotelean interpretation of Rand’s ethics according to which “the requirements of moral virtue were conceived as a constitutive part of the agent’s own interest.” That is to say, virtue is not merely instrumental to the achievement of one’s values. Virtuous action just is some essential part of your overall well-being. When that’s the case, you can’t duck out on virtue whenever that might seem convenient. Ducking out on virtue would gut a requirement of life as a rational being.  Or, put another way, it may seem that it is sometimes convenient to duck out on virtue, but it isn’t really.

Does this work?

In today’s essay, Neera Badhwar provides a sympathetic overview of this sort of strategy but registers some doubts:

Like Aristotle, Rand holds that the virtues, including justice, are not only means to the agent’s happiness, but also an essential, constitutive part of it. Julia Annas calls Aristotle’s ethical egoism a “formal” egoism because it essentially incorporates regard for others. Rand’s eudaimonistic egoism, likewise, is a formal egoism. But can even a formally egoistic justification of virtue give the right account of why we should be just and respect others’ rights? Surely the right account is that we should give others their due because it is their due — because people are ends in themselves — and not because doing so is necessary for our happiness. This objection, however, owes whatever force it has to the thought that justice can be inimical to our well-being, but we ought to be just even so. But as noted above, Rand holds that injustice is even worse for us. Giving others their due, she believes, is rational both because it is the appropriate response to an important normative fact, and because responding appropriately is necessary for our own happiness. Indeed, Rand defines each virtue in terms of the recognition of, and motivation by, some important fact, and holds that the pursuit of happiness is inseparable from the activity of maintaining one’s life through the rational pursuit of rational goals, that is, from virtuous activity (“The Objectivist Ethics,” 29, 32). Here, again, her view resembles that of Aristotle, who tells us that the virtuous person is motivated by what is truly good, pleasant, and useful, and that being motivated thus is the chief component of his happiness.

Rand’s fiction depicts her heroes’ virtues acting as a shield against misery even in the worst of misfortunes, and her villains’ vices as causing psychological turmoil or, at best, leaving them incapable of enjoying life, even in the greatest of good fortunes. Her depiction of Gail Wynand in The Fountainhead suggests that not only does he not get much out of life, but also that his ignorance of his own vice and of what is truly worth pursuing is in itself a great loss. Rand does not consider the possibility of circumstances under which someone who is less than perfectly virtuous may avoid disaster by doing a small wrong and, thus, end up better off than by doing the right thing. Rather, she suggests, like some other moralists, that even one small wrong is likely to introduce a fatal flaw into one’s character — or, alternatively, that no wrong is ever really a small wrong. But this is unrealistic. Not every wrong action leads to an unraveling of one’s character, and not every wrong action merits endless guilt and self-reproach. Moreover, some misfortunes resulting from an act of integrity or justice can reduce a person to despair, as they do Henry Cameron and Steven Mallory in The Fountainhead. Under such circumstances, I think the eudaimonistic justification for acting virtuously fails — but not, perhaps, all egoistic justification. For it can still be a matter of pride and integrity to do what is right, regardless of the consequences.

I’m looking forward to seeing Huemer’s reply to the “virtue-as-constitutive-of-well-being” strategy.

On the face of it, the neo-Aristotelean interpretation of Rand’s virtue theory implies only that selectively shirking the demands of virtue harms the agent’s interests, not that respecting others’ rights is a demand of virtue.

As long as virtue and vice are defined relative to a substantive conception of the individual agent’s self-interest, rather than defined relative to the requirements of a mutually advantageous scheme of social cooperation, congruence between virtue and rights will be very doubtful. This happy convergence of the good and the right is much more likely if  we begin with a credible picture of human nature that emphasizes human hypersociality and the complex cultural background conditions required for the development of the norms and expectations behind well-functioning schemes of property rights. But that’s not what Rand offers us.

Another way to think about the problems in Rand’s transition from egoism to rights is to ask whether her moral and political thought has the resources to deal with disputes over the requirements of virtue and or the definition of justice or rights? How would she answer Locke when he says:

… though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in application of it to their particular cases.

The upshot of Locke’s thought here is that social order — the coordination of individual action in a peaceful, stable, ongoing scheme — requires that individuals regularly set aside their inevitably conflicting idiosyncratic conclusions about the requirements of virtue or justice and submit to a distinctively public rule of law. Effective coordination, social order, requires that individuals comply with public rules — with an official interpretation of rights — that they sometimes do not judge compatible with their private interpretation of the demands of virtue.

Now, it’s not clear to me that it is even permissible for a Randian egoist to follow a public rule when (a) she judges compliance to be contrary to her self-interest and (b) she is sure her noncompliance won’t be detected. This does not seem to me a promising basis for social order and civil society.

The anguished cries of left-leaning folk over the Citizens United ruling seem to me to be emanating from an alternate universe, so bizarre are they. This was a case about whether the state can suppress the distribution of an unflattering documentary about a powerful political candidate produced by a small group of private citizens. The crazy thing to me is that anyone ever thought that such a rule was not in blatant violation of the First Amendment. The extra-crazy thing is that four Supreme Court justices evidently think this kind of state censorship of political speech is hunky dory. I’m going to chalk up some of the freakout to this week’s spectacular pileup of disasters for progressives. Sorry guys. I know it’s been rough. But I have to say I was taken aback by the vehemence with which people I like and admire have insisted that the state must selectively silence political speech. I didn’t realize that this was such a profound point of disagreement. As I see it, these regulations have accomplished very little other than to protect the interests of powerful, entrenched incumbent politicians against public criticism.

I’m tempted to conclude that the divide between progressives and ACLU-style civil libertarians on this issue has to do with differences in our conceptions of the relationship between equality of democratic voice and the legitimacy of democratic elections. But I’m not sure that’s right. I suspect the real issue is more an empirical one about the actual balance of power with or without this kind of regulation. I see this ruling as vindicating the importance of equality of voice by protecting the rights of individuals and associations to speak out on behalf of their interests and values. Progressives clearly see the ruling primarily as some kind of corporate-empowerment initiative. But you can’t really take on Big Agra or Wall Street unless you can organize to speak out against the Chuck Grassleys and Chuck Schumers when it really counts.

I wonder how we could go about gather evidence about the distribution of political power. I suppose coming to some agreement about what counts as political power would be the first step in settling the dispute.

Anyway, I think Tim Lee and Matt Welch are making a lot of sense.

In a blog post yesterday complaining about how Barack Obama is a big nancy, Krugman writes:

Progressives are desperately in need of leadership; more specifically, House Democrats need to be told to pass the Senate bill, which isn’t what they wanted but is vastly better than nothing. And what we get from the great progressive hope, the man who was offering hope and change, is this: [Obamian pusillanimity]

Krugman believes in his bleeding heart of hearts that his furious white-hot laserbeam rhetoric at its maximum amplitude can induce a microstroke in the brain of an enemy from distances of up to seven-hundred miles. Just imagine what he imagines the President can do! Vaporize an armada with a whim? Suspend gravity within a square-mile? But Obama need do so little–merely to tell House Democrats to pass the Senate bill. He’s THE PRESIDENT, for chrissake. If only he would tell them what they NEED to be told, instantly waffling Dems will become a zombie army able only to lurch to their doom. But, no. Obama will let his puppets be real boys and do what they like. It’s not that there should be an ashram of dishonor for representatives who refuse the pyre. It’s that there is no refusing when the Executive sacks up and speaks! What a disgrace, that Obama. Angry Krugman spits lava at the sound of your wilting name.

Over at Cato Unbound, Rod Long commences “The Winnowing of Ayn Rand.” Rod seems to sign on to and endorse the eudaimonist interpretation of Rand’s ethics, natural teleology and all. But (as anyone who followed Unbound’s corporatism issue will know), Rod thinks historical capitalism is corporatist by nature and that the non-aggression principle implies that only a stateless society can have a really free market. Importantly, Rod points out along the way that Rand, far from being a philosophical lightweight, anticipated several central strains of contemporary philosophical thought.

Some quality analysis from my Cato colleagues John Samples and David Boaz:

When Samples says “back to Reagan,” it should be emphasized that Reagan was a huge deficit spender, Brown looks to be in the same mold, and that’s not good. And, just judging from last night’s victory speech, I’m skeptical of the claim that Brown didn’t run on national security issues. Anyway, Reagan certainly did, so “back to Reagan,” wrinkles and all, sounds about right.

That’s the topic of this month’s Cato Unbound. If you answer “nothing” to either half of the question, feel free to move right along. For the rest of you, Doug Rasmussen’s lead essay contains some really interesting questions (in addition to some really interesting analysis). Here’s his first question. What do you say?

What is Rand’s justification for individual rights? Does it succeed? What is the function of the concept of rights?  Is it rooted in human flourishing?  If so, how?  Is it a human virtue? Is it a deontological (duty) concept, or is it a different type of ethical norm?  Does Rand have a single justification for rights?  If Rand does not have an adequate argument, does she suggest paths that might be developed?  Or, is there no hope in this regard, and if so, is there any way to justify individual rights?

Here’s Rand on rights.

In my opinion, Rand’s case for her version of individual rights fails. Rand’s ethics says that individuals ought to act in their rational self-interest. Rights, if they are anything, are constraints on the pursuit of self-interest. On the face of it, Rand needs to solve the compliance problem — why should a rational egoist comply with constraints on self-interested action? — and the way to solve the compliance problem is to show that mutual restraint is generally to mutual advantage. But I don’t think Rand ever shows this. Instead she goes off the rails trying to argue that rational thought, and therefore a distinctively human life, is impossible in the absences of a strong version of the non-coercion principle, and that predation or parasitism are never in an individual’s self-interest. None of that is convincing. (A strong version of the non-coercion principle is not in effect, but we’re doing fine thinking rationally and living human lives. Lots of people live long and satisfying lives of institutionalized parasitism and predation, especially in and around Washington, DC.) That said, I think Rand’s emphasis on the role of individual rights in generating creativity and entrepreneurial effort remains enlightening.

A sound argument for the institution of property looks like this [doc].

This article in Reason by William Eggers and John O’Leary is the best diagnosis of self-defeating libertarian habits I’ve seen. I’m often frustrated with what I call libertarian schizophrenia — a kind of incoherent ping-ponging between public support for incremental reforms that would improve the function of both government and markets and the self-righteous performance of anarchist state-smashing rhetoric.

When I worked at the Institute for Humane Studies, I argued that the Institute should try placing Koch Fellows in the bureaucracy and not just at think tanks. I didn’t convince anybody. I guess a state apparatus entirely innocent of moderating libertarian influence will eventually collapse under the pressure of its internal contradictions. Right?

My new column for The Week, “Let the Next Crisis Go to Waste,” argues that the theme of the Aughts is the exploitation of crisis for political ends, and that the damn decade isn’t over yet (but not for pedantic math reasons).

Here’s one Robert Higgs (Mr. Crisis and Leviathan himself, I presume, or a passable spiritual medium) in the comments:

The Bush and Obama administrations have both been raging successes. Just look at how much the government’s powers and its budget have grown. The ruling elites have got exactly what they seek. Rather than calling them fools, we might rather call the rest of us fools, for supposing that these people give a damn about us and for putting up with them hell, in all too many instances, actually supporting them.

Indeed, it is the pantswetting public’s “Do something! Anything!” attitude to which we owe our political ill fortune.

This is from David Hume’s essay “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion.”

In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: It enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.

I believe, however, everyone will agree with me, that, notwithstanding this resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much masters of what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep. Philosophers have endeavored to render happiness entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of perfection is impossible to be attained: But every wise man will endeavour to place his happiness on such objects chiefly as depend upon himself: and that is not to be attained so much by any other means as by delicacy of sentiment. When a man is possessed of this talent, he is more happy by what pleases his taste, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece of reasoning than the most expensive luxury can afford.

What do you make of this as a middle ground between internal and external accounts of the causes of happiness? Is this idea of the delicacy of taste elitist? Would that be an objection to it?

Anyway, I think Hume does an excellent job here of articulating a good deal of what Mill later had in mind when speaking of “higher” pleasures. And that reminds me that I just read a fascinating paper on Mill’s account of higher pleasures by Elijah Milgram [gated].