I’m firmly in the McArdle/Cowen/Cannon camp in the argument over whether insuring the currently uninsured will have any net effect on mortality within this class. But I think it’s important to emphasize more than others have done that
(a) Extending insurance to the currently uninsured will have no net effect on mortality,
and
(b) Extending insurance to the currently uninsured will save no lives,
are different propositions, and that the truth of (a) does not imply the truth of (b).
Extending insurance to the currently uninsured would save some people’s lives while killing others.
The people most likely to be saved are older, unhealthy people who are now uninsured because they cannot afford insurance. These people would get treatment they need but can’t afford. The people most likely to be killed are people who can now afford but do not want insurance because they are young, healthy and are able to self-insure (or are in a position to be insured by their relatively family). If compelled to buy a health plan, these people would tend to consume more medical care than they would otherwise, exposing them to the very real risks of unnecessary treatment.
I think it’s reasonable to guess that the people most likely to be saved are relatively poor (but not poor enough for Medicaid) and just below the age of Medicare eligibility. The people most likely to be killed are relatively wealthy and in their twenties.
So, while insuring the currently uninsured might come out as a wash in terms of lives saved versus lives lost (or even if there is a small net decrease in mortality), the way one would expect this to affect the distribution of mortality could lead to a decrease in QALYs, which is worth taking into account.
Of course, I don’t know that this is so. This is conjecture, but I think it makes sense. Generally, I’d like to see more about the distributive effects of the Democrats’ HCR plans.
[Update: Links added above for those unaware of the ongoing debate. See also links at end of Megan's linked post.]