Wendell Hoenir of the Objective Standard blog offers a long reply to my off-the-cuff comment the other day about Rand’s failure to show the coherence of her ethical egoism and theory of rights.
Wilkinson’s only remotely plausible objection is his allegation that Rand’s egoist has no reason to refrain from coercion because it seems as though he can profit from predation and parasitism. The example of comfortable beltway bureaucrats feeding off the public trough could lend one pause. But how are we to evaluate Wilkinson’s smug contention that these people live satisfying lives—and his implication that they would not live better lives if they were producers rather than plunderers?
Anticipating that I might point to happiness research as evidence that there are happy bureaucrats, Hoenir riffs a bit on some posts of mine about happiness research, and ends up here:
Wilkinson himself admits that we can be wrong about how happy we are. If that’s true, then we’d better not measure the self-interest of an act by the extent to which it affords us temporary material comfort or superficial self-satisfaction. Instead we must appeal to philosophic principles that measure the value of an action or policy to the life of a being who survives by reason—principles such as the virtues of independence, production, honesty, and integrity—none of which support the initiation of force.
I’m not sure what to makes of this. I’m cautiously but not profoundly skeptical about the validity of life satisfaction self-reports. On the whole, the data suggest that places with high levels of economic and political freedom tend to be happier than those with lower levels. I think this does count as evidence that freedom is good for happiness. Not decisive evidence, but evidence.
Hoenir suggests that, instead of appealing to this kind of empirical evidence, we “appeal to philosophical principles that measure the value of an action or policy to the life of a being that survives by reason.” Hoenir says that none of these principles support the initiation of force. This sort of begs the question, doesn’t it? The question was whether an ethical egoist has sufficient reason to comply with the non-aggression principle. One can’t answer the question simply by asserting an unproven conjecture that, as a matter of fact, the pursuit of self-interest does requires strict adherence to principles that forbid non-defensive coercion. We’d need to first confirm or validate that these principles are a requirement of rational self-interest and that they forbid the use of first force. How would we do this?
Well, Randians reject the possibility of a priori knowledge or analytic truth, as do I, so we can agree that these are empirical claims requiring empirical or inductive validation. Now, there is an emerging empirical literature in positive psychology on character strengths and virtues. My sense it is that the virtues Hoenir mentions are indeed virtues (though they are probably not defined as Hoenir would define them). However, it is not at all clear that practicing these virtues entail a refusal to initiate coercion, or to benefit from the systematic violation of classical liberal property rights.
Is it Hoenir’s claim that police officers required to initiate coercion against people involved in consensual crimes cannot, ipso facto, practice these virtues to their full extent, and therefore cannot reap the alleged benefits of doing so? Even if the police officer sincerely believes that he or she is not acting unjustly? If so, Hoenir’s theory makes a prediction: other things equal, police officers in jurisdictions with fewer laws against consensual activity are happier. Maybe it’s true! It would be interesting to find out.
How about people who do not directly coerce others, but benefit from systematic coercion? Let’s consider a story.
Ann is a bureaucrat. A political liberal, she believes in her work at HHS and finds it extremely satisfying. She is convinced that government can make the world a better place and she works hard every day to do her part making sure that it does. She can see how the program she works for helps families in need, she feels like she’s making a difference, and that’s meaningful to her. Ann has a devoted husband (who is a lawyer for the EPA) and two delightful children. They go to church every Sunday where they learn about to importance of love for all people and the immense importance of service to others. Of Ann’s many activities, she finds most nourishing volunteering with her children at a community soup kitchen. She’s proud of how her kids have so enthusiastically embraced their obligation to help those who need help. She’s especially proud of how they have come, like her, to value hard work, independent-mindedness, honesty, and integrity. Ann and her husband are paid well by the government, and they’re good with money. They’re very comfortable and have a terrific work-life balance. They’re also active, fit, and very healthy. Ann loves her life. She has a lot of energy, is in a good mood most of the time, has very few regrets. When she becomes frustrated or sad, she bounces back quickly. When she reflects on her life, she is extremely grateful for everything she has.
Is Ann happy?
Of course she is. If your theory about the conditions under which people can be happy says “No,” your theory is busted.
Is this story realistic?
I think so. Washington, DC is full of people and families much like this.
I conclude that “parasitism” (i.e., living off of the proceeds of a system of state coercion) is compatible with virtue and happiness. All it really takes, I think, is believing sincerely that the system is just and that you’re doing a good thing. As long as you think you’re supporting your life “neither by robbery nor alms” and not deriving your happiness “from the injury or the favor of others,” you’re probably fine as long as the system of robbery, alms, injury, and favor is more or less stable, which ours is.