Happiness and the Delicacy of Taste

by Will Wilkinson on January 13, 2010

This is from David Hume’s essay “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion.”

In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: It enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.

I believe, however, everyone will agree with me, that, notwithstanding this resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much masters of what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep. Philosophers have endeavored to render happiness entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of perfection is impossible to be attained: But every wise man will endeavour to place his happiness on such objects chiefly as depend upon himself: and that is not to be attained so much by any other means as by delicacy of sentiment. When a man is possessed of this talent, he is more happy by what pleases his taste, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece of reasoning than the most expensive luxury can afford.

What do you make of this as a middle ground between internal and external accounts of the causes of happiness? Is this idea of the delicacy of taste elitist? Would that be an objection to it?

Anyway, I think Hume does an excellent job here of articulating a good deal of what Mill later had in mind when speaking of “higher” pleasures. And that reminds me that I just read a fascinating paper on Mill’s account of higher pleasures by Elijah Milgram [gated].

  • Whig
    Yes it's elitist; no that's not a valid objection to the truth of the premise.
  • lhhunt
    I think Hume's main point is to some extent obsolete today. It's the old Socratic idea that we should focus on the "goods of the soul" because we can control them, while the external world (including on some accounts our dear friends and relatives) is controlled by implacable fate. The implacable fate idea was very plausible then, but less so today. As Ortega put it:

    "For the 'common' man of all periods 'life' had principally
    meant limitation, obligation, dependence; in a word, pressure. Say
    oppression, if you like, provided it be understood not only in the
    juridical and social sense, but also in the cosmic. For it is this
    latter which has never been lacking up to a hundred years ago, the
    date at which starts the practically limitless expansion of scientific
    technique..."

    I would only add that even the "uncommon" man was much more subject to cosmic oppression than ordinary folks today, in some of the same ways that the common one was. When I get a headache, I take Ibuprofen or Midrin and it is gone. King George III just had to put up with it.
  • The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much masters of what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep.

    There's a very privileged assumption underlying that statement. If you're, say, a refused asylum-seeker who doesn't speak English, or you've been subjected to a control order without being able to see the evidence against you, you're not going to be master of any of those things.
  • That's interesting. I've always thought of Mill's "higher pleasures" as a sub silentio concession to the virtues. Instead of basing his theory on pleasure simpliciter, he effectively gives greater weight to the sorts of happiness that only the more virtuous typically enjoy. A meta-consequence of this idea would presumably be that the optimal political structures (the greatest "happiness" for the greatest number) will be aimed in part at cultivating virtue.
  • Sarah
    I'm interested by his claim that educated taste in the arts and sciences is good for friendships and romantic relationships.

    It's certainly true that the educated have fewer divorces. Often this is interpreted as caused by socioeconomic conditions, or by "family values" in the educated classes (I hear a lot of these sorts of arguments from Ross Douthat.) But it may simply be that the more educated you are, the more you look for someone with similar intellectual experiences and tastes, and the choosier you are in that regard. Favorite books are a very good touchstone for determining if I'll get along with someone. If I hadn't read many books, my sieve would be much coarser, and I'd be far more likely to marry the wrong person.
  • thehova83
    I was just thinking about how William James argued almost the exact opposite (man should develop passions which surpass mere likes and dislikes).
  • thehova83
    I really do believe that part of the purpose of a liberal arts education is to cultivate a love for cheap things.

    English majors might not make much money, but they can always appreciate the wonders of Proust.
  • sam
    I dunno. As that highly respected philosopher Mel Brooks put it, "It's good to be the king."
  • mk
    I like the idea: cultivate appetites that are more likely to be satisfied, and whose satisfaction you can control. I would also suggest favoring appetites that are "positive-sum" or good for the world. I.e., not 15" rims on a beamer, but (if you believe in AGW) a hybrid or small car. Insufferable example, I know.

    E.g., if you have enough money, it's good to be a foodie, and/or a music omnivore.

    (At a detailed level, I'm not sure I fully understand Hume's distinctions. He says that it is desirable to be a person who loves "polite conversation" but hates "rudeness" but it is undesirable to be someone who really likes "favors and good offices" but hates "injury." The difference is subtle, too subtle I think.)

    But the general point is good: tune your sensitivities towards things you can change. Niebuhr put it: "God give me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change."
  • Rhayader
    This sort of reminds me of Robert Pirsig's definition of Dynamic Quality, which he called "the knife-edge of reality." He says that a certain qualitative relationship is needed between subject and object; that without this fundamental "quality", there is indeed no interaction or engagement between subject (internal reality) and object (external reality).

    Anyway, I'm doing a much poorer job of explaining than Pirsig himself, but this idea of a "delicacy of taste" sounds like another way of saying a heightened sensitivity to Dynamic Quality.
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