Ackerman on Rawls

by Will Wilkinson on December 23, 2009

I just got around to reading Bruce Ackerman’s 1994 paper “Political Liberalisms,” and I wish I’d gotten to it sooner. It contains a splendid rant against Rawls’ stupid “closed society” assumption and some congenial speculation about the direction liberal progress might take:

It is true, of course, that we are a long way away from world federalism. Over the next generation, progress toward this distant goal will come, if it comes at all, at the level of regional federation. The most important struggle will be over European union. If the Europeans conquer the nationalistic madness of the twentieth century, and create a federal union, an even more expansive federation may not look so crazy to the next generation. If the Europeans fail, political liberalism is in for another age of anxiety.

This is, if you like, an unfashionably Eurocentric diagnosis. But Americans have an important role to play as well. We have also begun a regional project by redefining the boundaries of our free-trade area to include Canada and Mexico. If this initiative is successful, North Americans may find the political will to use it as the basis of a more perfect union-in which the free movement of goods is followed by the free movement of people and then by the construction of a political federation. This project may take longer than the European experiment in federation. But we must learn to think big.

This was 1994. It’s pretty disappointing that in the intervening 15 years Europe has done so much to unleash freedom of movement and association while North America has done so little.

Anyway, Ackerman’s claim that “we must learn to think big” is part of a larger complaint that Rawls is not utopian enough. I don’t agree that this was ever Rawls’s problem. I do agree with Ackerman that Rawls’s nationalism is an indefensible capitulation to the evidently unjust global status quo, and Rawls is in this sense an almost reactionary thinker. But the complaint to level against Rawls on this score is that he simply fails to think like a liberal at all, not that he fails to rouse us with sufficiently inspiring feats of putatively liberal utopian imagination.

So when Ackerman goes on to try to skewer Rawls for failing to really vehemently insist that liberalism demands that a strongly egalitarian conception of social justice be built into the constitution, he totally loses me. On his own terms, Ackerman manages to argue that “strongly egalitarian principles for the distribution of basic resources” are not ruled out by his favored principle of liberal neutrality. When one recognizes that complacent nationalism is flatly inconsistent with the foundational liberal assumption of the equal freedom of persons, one “thinks big” simply by thinking basic liberal thoughts about borders, citizenship, and what not. When one discovers “strongly egalitarian principles” at the end of a thought experiment about a bunch of spacefaring folk colonizing an uninhabited planet, that’s a rather different flavor of big-think, I think, and utopian in the bad way.

That said, there are some great bits in this paper, which is a good deal livelier and combative than I was expecting from the augustĀ Journal of Philosophy.

  • William Ruger
    Dear Will,

    I guess I'm a knuckle-dragging classical liberal because I don't think one has to be a cosmopolitan to be a good liberal. This might explain why I have no moral qualms in theory with serving in an institution whose means include killing others to meet state interests (as long as the state's ends and means are relatively just). I think our basic difference might be that I think supranationalism in practice is more dangerous to liberty than trying to defend liberty at home and from abroad. I think this deserves a longer discussion than we can have here, but I'd recommend having a look at David Conway's In defence of the realm: the place of nations in classical liberalism. I don't agree with everything he says there, but it is worth a look on this point.

    Best,

    Will
  • Will, Thanks for the Conway rec'd. I'll check it out. I think this would make a great topic for Cato Unbound.
  • Horselips
    Arbitrary... arbitrary... I like that word - it's a great way to recognize a disingenuous jackass!

    Exactly what, in human society and law, is not arbitrary? Is is immoral to kill you? Why? Unless you're going to posit a deity as a arbiter of morality (not something liberals tend to be very keen on), all you're morality is arrrrrrbitrary. Why should you prefer your children to my children? The value you place on family is also arrrrbitrary. Why does Brad Pitt get to bang Angela Jolie and I don't? His good looks are based on arrrbitrary genetic luck. Why do people named Rockefeller have a lot more money than you or me? Their good fortune to be born into a rich family is also arrrrrbitrary.

    You equate arbitrariness with illegitimacy. Good luck with that! There is virtually no relationship within human experience that is not arrrrrbitrary. Which leaves you with no firmer leg to stand on than you think I have.

    I'd also point out that nations have been protecting the lives, property and interest of their citizens a long time before liberalism came along. Liberalism's primary contribution appears to be mostly deconstructing the institutions that have made any civilization possible at all. I submit civilization will prosper considerably better with nations and no liberalism than it will with liberalism and no nations.
  • Yes, you have to start somewhere. That doesn't mean that everything that follows is an arbitrary construction. Things make a lot more sense than you make them out to. I'll go through your claims one by one.

    "Is is immoral to kill you? Why?"

    Whether or not you go from a moral claim, utilitarian basis, or propagation of the species perspective the consensus is that there should be a law against murder.

    "Why should you prefer your children to my children? The value you place on family is also arrrrbitrary. "

    I prefer my children to yours because of both evolutionary responses and the simple fact I know them better than yours.

    "Why does Brad Pitt get to bang Angela Jolie and I don't? "

    Brad Pitt gets Angelina Jolie because they are consensual adults (very attractive ones at that). You don't get her because she didn't agree to it.

    "Why do people named Rockefeller have a lot more money than you or me? "

    Because someone named Rockefeller made a lot of money and decided to his descendants and not some anonymous stranger(s).

    "Their good fortune to be born into a rich family is also arrrrrbitrary."

    Someone had to be born to them.

    You can stop being envious, and enjoy your life for what you do have. There's no reason to lament what the unreachable, for I assure you there is much in life that is unreachable.

    A response to your final comment:

    "I'd also point out that nations have been protecting the lives, property and interest of their citizens a long time before liberalism came along. Liberalism's primary contribution appears to be mostly deconstructing the institutions that have made any civilization possible at all."

    Nations have been killing lives, destroying property, and acting in the negative interests of their citizens way before liberalism came along. The coin goes both ways.
  • bjk
    No freedom without empire!
  • Horselips
    I submit that if liberalism is incompatible with nationalism, that indicates a deficiency with liberalism, not nationalism.
  • urstoff
    Aside from the obvious criticism being a pithy non-argument, I really can't think of any way this statement could be possibly defensible. Nationalism is an arbitrary favoring of a set of human being based on nothing but geographical luck. As a basis for thought it is unjustified and as a basis for action it is stupid at best and morally heinous at worst.
  • I've not read that paper. (I'm not a huge fan of Ackerman, but I've read large parts of his _Social Justice and the Liberal State_ so I have some idea what he'd be up to. It mostly didn't make me want to read more.*) But I think that, if you're presenting his position correctly, he, and you, are misunderstanding what's going on in Rawls with this bit of his argument. There's nothing "nationalist" about it if that term has any of its normal meanings, for one thing. And nothing in Rawls's view opposes anything like the EU. (It's worth noting that as the EU has become stronger it's become _more_ state-like, including much harder external borders than many of the individual member-states had before. I don't think it's development supports Ackerman's position at all. It likely more supports some elements of Rawls's.) But the main point of that argument, beyond the practical elements focused on later in Law of Peoples, is that it's a part of the "strains of commitment" argument. If you read people complaining about this argument and they don't mention the idea of the strains of commitment, then you can be sure that they haven't understood the argument. I'm pretty sure this applies to Ackerman. Finally, it's worth noting (as most critics of it do not) that this is something assumed in the original position, not something we try to recreate in the real world. Most all the critics (including, it seems, Ackerman) misunderstand how the original position works. Anyway, I'd recommend going and reading Freeman's book Rawls on this to get a better understanding of the argument. There are plausible objections one might make to the argument and the various way it's used, but Ackerman is just confused.
    (It's worth noting that the Journal of Philosophy isn't blind reviewed and that Ackerman was on the editorial board for a long time, so it's not surprising that he could get some aggressive language in, even when he's quite confused.)

    *I do find this "citizen grant" stuff interesting, though I'm willing to assume that the most interesting parts are due to his co-author, Anne Alsott.
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