Here’s one of the most interesting things about the debate over climate policy prior to failure in Copenhagen. Advocates of a grand global accord seemed to grasp all along that the probability of securing an agreement with teeth was surpassingly small. However, to acknowledge this publicly would be to reduce the probability of success even further. And if somehow almost everybody comes to think that an agreement is not unrealistic, then the chances of success go up. In that kind of clap-for-Tinkerbell context, statements about the probability of success come to be seen as moves in a coordination game, because they are, whether or not they are intended to be.
It always seemed to me that anybody who knew anything would see that negotiating an effective, binding, international agreement was terribly far-fetched. Indeed, the fact that it seemed necessary to so many to clap for Tinkerbell was proof enough that it was indeed far-fetched. But, naturally enough, that didn’t keep boosters from clapping, or from frowning aggressively on those with the temerity to point out how unlikely it all was.
Anyway, now that Tinkerbell is dead, boosters have regained the permission to say things that ought to have been pretty obvious all along, which is refreshing, I guess. Here’s Jeffrey Sachs:
From the standpoint of actual reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions, this agreement is unlikely to accomplish anything real. It is non-binding and will probably strengthen the forces of opposition to emissions reductions. Who will take seriously the extra costs of emissions reduction if they see how lax others’ promises are?
The reality is that the world will now wait to see if the US accomplishes any serious emissions reduction. Grave doubts are in order on that score. Obama does not have the votes in the Senate, has not displayed any willingness to expend political capital to reach a Senate agreement, and may not even see a Senate vote on the issue in 2010 unless he pushes much harder than he has so far.
The Copenhagen summit also fell short on financial help from rich countries to poor countries. Plenty of numbers were thrown around, but most of these were, as usual, empty promises. Aside from announcements of modest outlays for the next few years, which might – just might – add up to a real few billion dollars, the big news was a commitment of $100 billion per year for the developing countries by 2020. Yet this figure was unaccompanied by any details about how it would be achieved.
Experience with financial aid for development teaches us that announcements about money a decade from now are mostly empty words. They do not bind the rich countries at all. There is no political will behind them.
How much of this should Sachs have been able to predict? More interesting: How much of it did he predict?