In a post on “Paying for Health” the philosopher Daniel Little writes:
It seems a bitter but unavoidable truth that there are very substantial inequalities in the provision of health care in our society. One person’s likelihood of surviving a devastating cancer may be significantly less than another person’s chances, simply based on the second person’s ability to pay for premium health care services. Further, it seems unavoidable that these extreme inequalities are flatly unjust in any society that believes in the equal worth of all human beings. And where this seems to lead is to the conclusion that some system of universal health insurance is a fundamental requirement of justice.
Clearly Little is merely gesturing at an argument, but I cannot follow the gesture. That some are able to afford, say, a treatment with very expensive new technology that significantly increases (how much is that?) their chances to survive a devastating cancer compared to the chances of those who cannot afford it does not seem to me unjust, flatly or otherwise. It seems a trivial consequence of the fact that new technology is often much more expensive than older technology. Moreover, it seems plain that any economically feasible scheme of universal health insurance must refuse to cover many expensive treatments (new or otherwise). So a system of universal health insurance will do nothing to eliminate “extreme inequalities” in many kinds of cases. In these cases, the only hope of eliminating the inequality is forbidding access to treatments that cannot be provided to all under the universal health insurance system. But a policy of coercively preventing exchanges that help someone (the doctor, at least!) but harm no one is flatly unjust. Which leads to the conclusion that the attempt to prevent some inequalities in the provision health care is ruled out by the requirements of justice.
If Little limited himself to the much weaker, and much more plausible, claim that justice demands a system of institutions that offers health care that isĀ as good as it getsĀ for the least well-off, then justice might plausibly demand in health services what we have (and Little seems to endorse) in food: a competitive market with means-tested vouchers.
That just about everyone left of center, including philosophers, seem to glide from their moral premises, whatever those might be, to “some system of universal health insurance” will some day be appreciated as the peculiar ideological reflex that it is.