Small and/or Limited Government: Some Distinctions

by Will Wilkinson on February 22, 2009

I feel the liberaltarianism discussion is often muddled because of confusion over a number of different ideas. I’m going to try to clear my own head here. Maybe it will be useful to others.

I think it’s important to distinguish “small government” from “limited government,” and to distinguish between a couple different senses of “limited.”

Let’s say government is small when government spending as a percentage of national economic output is relatively low. Small government, in this sense, will tend to have relatively low taxes. But the overall tax take tells us little about how the tax burden is distributed. It doesn’t tell us what the money is spent on. And it doesn’t tell us much about economic liberty.

Which society is freer? One with a smaller government where the very rich pay all the taxes (90 percent of the population pays no taxes! 90 percent libertopia?) or one with a slightly larger government with a relatively low level of taxation spread more or less evenly over the whole population? (Should we do a poll on this?)

The fact that a government is small doesn’t rule out the possibility of egregious restrictions on non-economic liberties or of incredibly burdensome economic regulation. Suppose it takes two years to fill out all the paperwork, get all the licenses, etc. to start a small business, but once you do that, your profits aren’t taxed all. Suppose many forms of exchange are simply prohibited. You might have small government, low taxes, and very little economic freedom. Of course, a small government can ban abortion, prostitution, drugs, a free press, etc. just as well as a big one. Such a government may need to spend a lot of its modest budget on police and prisons instead of on genuine public goods. The size of the budget as as percentage of output doesn’t tell you anything about the composition of spending. This is a really important point. The United States spends a lot on prisons, the military, drug law enforcement, border patrol, etc. A lot of this is the opposite of rights-respecting, and a lot of it is downright wasteful. The composition of spending is important both as a matter or morality and a matter of economic growth (which I happen to think is also a matter of morality.)  Which is all to say, the fact that a government is small logically implies almost nothing about either liberty, justice or efficiency.

(Also, as a technical tangent, there may be economies of scale in the provision of certain public goods. So a smaller country whose government provides precisely the same goods as a bigger country may turn out to have a bigger government, simply because it costs them a little more to provide the goods. Slightly weaker economic performance relative to the bigger country may result, but a cutback in spending on those goods won’t improve performance if they are growth-enabling.)

Limited government is really what matters, but “limited” is also a bit ambiguous. The most important sense is “rights-respecting.” Bills of rights are meant to declare that legitimate (and legal) government is limited to activities that do not violate rights. Many disputes between classical and modern liberals turn on their theories of rights. For example, if the collective action problems inherent in the provision of certain public goods justifies taxation, then a state that collects taxes for this purpose does not violate property rights. If you think there is no such justification for taxation, you’ll tend to see the taxing state as violating rights and thus overstepping its proper limits. If you think there is such a justification for taxation, and believe there is an abundance of collective action problems that may be resolved only by government action, then you may think that a quite high level of taxation and government spending is perfectly consonant with limited, property-rights respecting government. 

Here’s an aside about libertarian theory that I think helps transition to another, related, idea of “limited.” Though most libertarians are not anarchists, the outsized influence of property-rights-focused anarchists within the broader libertarian community somehow seems to create a lot of confusion, when it ought to help clarify the issue. The so-called “minarchist” or “minimal government” view accepts the public goods justification of the state, while the anarchist rejects it. The anarchist argues either (1) that the protection of rights is an individual good and that individuals can successfully protect their rights by going to the market and contracting with private rights-protection agencies or (2) all public goods, including the protection of rights, can be successfully provided using markets and other forms of voluntary association. Anarchists often argue that if the public goods argument for state protection of rights (and the system of public finance it implies) is sound, then there is no principled basis for stopping at “minimal” government. The scope of legitimate government will be however wide the logic of the public goods or market failure argument happens to take you. There are a number of possible minarchist replies here (the specialness of the use of coercion in the rights protection business, etc.), but I basically think the anarchist critique is correct. If there is something especially unstable in private markets for rights protection, and that fact justifies public provision of that service, then there might be other kinds of market failures that justify the public provision of those markets’ services. 

I think this takes us to another sense of “limited government” as “limited to what non-government alternatives cannot do better.” An obvious implication of market failure arguments for state provision of certain services is that the state should not be in the business of providing services where markets or other voluntary mechanisms are superior. There’s no justification for the coercive tax-financing of state enterprises when those goods and services would be provided (usually with higher quality and a lower price) with no state coercion. Also, state enterprises will tend to crowd out private enterprises both by (a) absorbing capital and using it badly and (b) by virtue of its inherent advantages in securing anti-competitive subsidies and barriers to entry, which is all the more reason to limit government to the things we actually need it for.

Let me wrap it up. The “size” of government is not a good proxy for either economic or non-economic liberty or for economic performance. Advocates of “small government” need to worry more than they do about the moral and economic dimensions of the composition of spending, and they need to realize that they care more than they think they do about questions of “distributive justice,” which is pretty obviously manifest in enthusiasm for reforms, like the “flat” and “fair” tax.

I think our real concern ought to be limited government. But whether you think an ideally limited government is also small will depends on lots of things including your account of rights, your beliefs about the relative efficiency and reliability of state vs. market provision of various goods, your beliefs about the necessity of public spending to facilitate growth, and more. The claim behind my version of  ”liberaltarianism” is that there is a principled position between classic night-watchman “minarchism” and full-on modern liberalism. If you’re not an anarchist or totalitarian, then you think that it’s possible for the state to do either too little or too much. Minarchist libertarians seem to be a bit embarrassed by the concessions they do make on the way to arguing for a state, and so stick as close as they can to their anarchists friends without going all the way stateless. But the anarchists are right that the minarchists have, in some sense already “given away the store,” and that it would be pretty surprising if the logic of the minarchist argument allowed them to stop where they do. On the other side of the equation, modern liberals need to get more credit from libertarians in desiring and defending limited government. The governments of the successful liberal democracies are in fact remarkably limited relative to the possibilities, both in terms of respect for rights and in refraining from crowding out the efficient private provision of goods and services–which explains their success. That said, it would be pretty surprising if either the modern liberal state or modern liberal theory (which often looks suspiciously like ad hoc apologetics for the modern liberal state) gets the limits of government right as either a matter of morality or efficiency.  

There’s lots of other stuff to talk about: the paternalism of modern liberalism as a failure of limited government; the consistency of social insurance and poverty-mitigating redistribution with a principled account of limited government; and other stuff–but those are separate posts.

  • Ak Mike
    Jim M - is it possible that fairly free liberal democracies are more common among prosperous states that can afford a lot of government? And that poorer societies tend to have less freedom, but also can afford less government?
  • <quote>
    Anarchists often argue that if the public goods argument for state protection of rights (and the system of public finance it implies) is sound, then there is no principled basis for stopping at “minimal” government."
    </quote>

    Tthis does not make sense. If you like coffee with a spoon of sugar, does it mean you will like it with ten?

    In a Democracy, then, shouldn't it be the people that decide whether their government is to be small/limited/whatever? Isn't that what we have elections for?

    Sure, this is subjective and dynamic. And that's the point: there is no objective measure of the size of a government.

    - Sreedhar
  • Jim M
    It turns out that under a relatively restricted or negative sense of liberty, across the world government size does not predict less freedom. Look at the components of the Heritage Foundation's economic freedom index--the government size component correlates negatively with all the ones related to business, secure property, and freedom from corruption. Now, in a longitudinal sense--over time in the US, for example--you might have a case. But then you have to start weighing, say, the liberty to own other people as property against the liberty that derives from prohibitions against making me someone's property.
  • Fantastic post, as usual Will. This is something I've been thinking about for a long time, this distinction between small and limited, and where one can draw the line and say, no this government is already limited enough in this area. Privatization is not the answer here. It's a very difficult question to muddle through, however, because your not likely to find many people who agree on many of the various possibilities. This is the trick with the concept of liberaltarianism, too. A rights-based approach is also inherently objective. Nevertheless, I think you're precisely right that "Limited" and not merely "Small" is the best approach to determining where to extend or retract the public sphere. At least in this context the discussion can proceed with integrity.
  • Aaron
    Will, just curious, what would your ideal version or a properly ordered limited government look like (i.e., what activities would they sponsor and/.or be involved in)?
  • Nicholas Weininger
    Will, I note that this post doesn't address what I think is among the most important consequentialist-anarchist critiques of the state: namely, entrusting the solution of a collective action problem to the state doesn't actually solve the collective action problem, it just replaces it by another, different, very possibly worse collective action problem.

    It seems to me that pro-state libertarians have yet to give an account of why the collective action problem of getting the state to provide public goods reasonably well in the face of public choice issues is all that much easier to solve than the collective action problem of getting voluntary institutions to provide the same goods. Yes, states can force free riders and holdouts into line without the messy complexity of dominant assurance contracts. But the power to do so is functionally identical to the power to let a class of rent-seekers predate on everyone else under color of law, and states do lots of that.

    You may think I'm asking essentially "Well, sure it works in practice, but does it work in theory?" And to some extent I am, but my point is that without a theoretical account we cannot have any confidence that the current state of practical affairs will persist over the long run. As Jer points out, despotism is the historical norm and liberalism of any variety may be for all we know a fluke departure from that norm, a bubble in the quantum foam, soon to pop.
  • Nobody wants to do bad things per se. But lots of people want to do things they think are good, but that are really bad. The drug war is the case in point.

    As for the causal mechanism, I think there's more than one. First, any demand for bad programs (whose sponsors may think they're good) is a demand for the resources to fund them. For public choice reasons, that demand will typically be filled by taxes or borrowing or inflation, not by cuts in other programs. Second, as Patrick indicated, a larger source of resources enables more bad stuff to be done; his example of the Iraq War being enabled by a bloated military establishment is excellent. (This example also supports the first mechanism, inasmuch as the demand for an ill-considered war in Iraq justified a big jump in government spending.) Third, gov't programs create interest groups that lobby for their preservation and expansion. There are probably more mechanisms, but I think I've said enough.

    As for how more Denmarks and Singapores would screw up the correlation... well, yeah. If we had more outliers, the correlation would be lower. And if we had more Frances, the correlation would be higher. So what? Point is, we don't have more Denmarks and Singapores, and I suspect the mechanisms listed are among the reasons.
  • I don't think I disagree, but I worry the mechanisms you mention are too strong and predict that the neoliberal reforms that put half the countries in the Economic Freedom Top 10 didn't happen.

    I'm willing to bet real money (but not a lot!) that we will both get more small-government authoritarianism and more big-government market liberalism in the next couple decades!
  • Will, you're right that small gov't and limited gov't are cross-cutting distinctions. In principle, you can have one without the other. But Patrick is absolutely correct that there are systematic reasons to expect them to be correlated in practice. A gov't with more resources is capable of doing more bad things. And a desire to do bad things leads to demand for more resources.

    Your point about Social Security is too glib. Yes, there are some major programs that can be run cheaply. But are these the rule? Fact is, intrusive programs tend to be expensive ones; the drug war is a nice example.

    The correlation between small and limited gov't is not 1, but it's surely positive. And it's a correlation that reflects underlying causation.
  • Glen, I agree that limited governments will tend to be smaller, but I'm not sure about the other way around. An optimal autocrat runs a lean state. But, yes, you can do more bad things with more resources. I'm not sure where you're bringing in the desire to do bad things. Who wants to do them?

    How expensive is the Drug War compared to Social Security? It's really not a glib point. SS is the sort of program where most of the size comes from in social democracies. That's why I want to pay more attention to the composition of spending. Social security is expensive, but it provides something that people want, just less efficiently than it could be. The drug was is a lot less expensive but it mostly ruins people's lives.

    I seriously don't understand the causal mechanism underlying your correlation. If we had more a lot more Denmarks on the one hand and a lot more Singapores on the other, the correlation could easily be negative. What's keeping us from that world?


  • Steve M.
    I agree with almost all of this. What's more, it seems pretty obviously correct, so kudos to you, Will. Fight the good fight. But I think this kind of discussion is badly incomplete. There are important metaphysical and empirical questions about the nature of democratic states for which, it seems to me, we don't have anything like satisfactory answers. Constitutions don't work just because they're written down. What makes them work? Constitutions can't, by their nature, actually encode all the rules that constitute the state (it's not just the latest fad in academic con law! They really can't! Work in the philosophy of language shows that it's actually true!), so how are the unwritten rules worked out and why do people follow them? Technocratic elites and their internal professional norms -- lawyers in the US -- are a good place to start, but is that the whole answer? And court orders? How do you get people in societies that don't rely on formalized judicial adjudication to start doing so? I don't think the story can just be about incentives created by economic growth, but who knows. There are political scientists and law professors working on this stuff, but our knowledge is still embarrassingly primitive. I mean, people in the West didn't used to do it, and then they started, and I've never read a compelling explanation for how and why it happened. For that matter, political scientists still have a surprisingly inadequate understanding of something as commonplace as presidential power. The president's power is this really complicated, incredibly fluid thing -- his ability to get other people to do what he wants depends his popularity, the precise constitution of Congress, the precise details of the administrative state, about a zillion facts about the courts, his personal charisma and use thereof, and no one has a detailed account of where it ends or how it works.

    These questions tell us about what the state is and what it's capable of. I'm always somewhat unsatisfied with discussions of how small, or large, the state should be or how much we can or should limit its authority that are divorced from this kind of question. Maybe it just isn't possible for a democratic state to be significantly more limited than modern, liberal states are because modern judicial and administrative systems structure the economy (and private life more generally?) in ways we don't quite understand, and technocratic elites (who in some sense are the state) work out the details of the administrative and judicial systems in ways that can't be settled by constitutional text?

    Bottom line: Will WIlkinson should write a book about the deep structure of the state.
  • Fascinating comment! I'm really interested in all the questions you bring up.
  • Steve M.
    On second thought, I should say I think it's probably possible to cabin the technocratic elites, but the cabining seems to have an effect on how much democracy you get.
  • Jer
    "A final gripe: libertarians seem too influenced by political theorists who were formed in the historically very singular and odd cluster of years in the middle two quartiles of the twentieth century."

    Is that true? Not your take on the libertarian perspective but the underlying claim, that totalitarianism is an anomaly historically. Whether a fully circumscribed citizen, a peasant to the lord, a subject to the king, a sheep to the clergy, or just a guy the chief could beat up, that's pretty much the norm for most (over all time and geography), isn't it?


  • Whenever I think about, talk about or write about government "growth" it's in terms of growth of power and control- the size of a limited government, of course, would be of less concern, except as it concerns cost and efficiency.
  • Michael
    Todd--

    Yes.
  • Michael
    Wilson, the anarchists may be right, and once you give the minarchists the inch they require, there's nothing IN PRINCIPLE stopping them from going the full mile. Will, this seems to be your worry in the post. That said, I wonder if there really is need for this worry. Can you think of a single historical case where gradually encroaching, legally enacted policy in government led to an 'oppressive predator state'? Sounds too much like Hegel (reality following the Concept and all that). 'Oppressive predator states' just about always come to power paroxysmally, through jolting internal or external revolutions, whereas those states (primarily Western Europe and Scandinavia) that fit the encroachment model best seem very, very unlikely to eventuate in any such totalitarian state any time soon--without, that is, something external and catastrophic happening. And if you're model or theory suggests that y ought to follow z, and y in fact does not follow z, then maybe it's time to readjust the theory. A final gripe: libertarians seem too influenced by political theorists who were formed in the historically very singular and odd cluster of years in the middle two quartiles of the twentieth century. I mean, is there really any reason any longer to put totalitarianism at the heart of political theory? Anarchy, for example, seems as potentially threatening a trend in the world today as totalitarianism actually was in the twentieth century.
  • WilsonF
    As other commentators have implied, I think your comments, while valid, understate the extent to which 'large' government leads to unlimited government in practice. This is an empirical question, of course, and I could be wrong. However, I strongly suspect that by concentrating resources in the hands of politicians an oppressive predator state is the eventual outcome, regardless of your underlying rights principles. In this way, I believe that "small" government has rhetorical value.

    Still a good post, and I agree with it.
  • Jayson Virissimo
    I have always preferred "limited government" to "small government" for exactly the reasons you stated. Excellent post Will.
  • Are there really those that advocate "small governmenyt" rather than "limited government"? In my experience, those who advocate small government do so as a simple proxy for limited government (as Will has defined those terms).
  • Ben1138
    I'd say some conservatives do. That would be the logical upshot of a decrease in taxes and the regulatory and redistributive state with a maintenance or increase in laws of social control (e.g. anti-abortion law, immigration restrictions, marriage law, etc.). Certainly, right now, the Republicans, as the political arm of conservative philosophy, is not interested in decreasing the regulatory or redistributive state.
  • I grant that they don't believe in "limited government, " I'm just not sure they really believe in "small government", however.
  • Todd
    Michael, would it be fair to rephrase your final words "as free as possible from destitution and catastrophe" to "as insulated as possible from destitution and catastrophe"?
  • Look at Brunei - No income tax, free government-provided health care and education...yet its citizens are subject to Sharia law.

    Quite a mix.
  • Ben1138
    Singapore as well, and many other East Asian countries. Dubai and the gulf states, too.
  • Mikk
    But if you happen to be imported Indian worker in Dubai, your passport is taken away immidietly on landing and later you live in concentration camp. And if you want to do business there, you must have local (Arab) partner/co-owner. That´s the law. It is not taxing, but you still have to give away 50% of your shares, so how much different is this.

    Well, in Hong Kong they treat guest workers from mainland similar ways..
  • Michael
    Will, Great Post! As a non-libertarian, non-conservative myself, some of these debates are opaque to me. So here's a general question, and maybe you have an obvious answer: your account of liberaltarianism, which I think is pretty awesome, still opposes markets to the states, as if markets are somehow independent of the state, and state intrusion into the market is always as an exogenous force. Wouldn't it be better to distinguish between the regulatory and the redistributive/public goods functions of the state? To risk an analogy, the state's cut of the economy is not like the dealer's cut in a game of poker; it's more like the casino's cut, the cut the casino earns by enabling and regulating all the games in the first place.

    Also, and just an aside: as a liberal, I've always been a little flummoxed when conservatives and libertarians want to turn arguments about public and governmental policy into arguments about the size or limits of government. It's just a fat red herring. As a liberal, a less limited or larger government may be the side-effects of the policies I would like to see, but they certainly are not the intention or point. What I want to see is a government where the least advantaged members are relatively as free as possible from destitution and catastrophe.
  • JB
    "What I want to see is a government where the least advantaged members are relatively as free as possible from destitution and catastrophe."

    And that is your prime point of disagreement with conservatives and libertarians.

    You want the state to equalize outcomes whereas the c's and the l's aren't concerned with outcomes, they are concerned with individual liberty (the l's generally wanting more of it).

    Equalizing outcomes tends to be a fool's game (for a whole host of reasons: skill, luck, will, etc.) The only true equality is death so it scares me when I hear people demanding equal outcomes. Using the power of the state to seek those outcomes is even scarier; it's something best left to private and non-coercive efforts. You are welcome to help people as much as you feel like, but pointing a gun at my head is neither moral nor effective.
  • Todd
    Patrick is right. Will, this post was weak sauce.
  • Joe R.
    Agreed. We tried limited government once. It eventually unlimited itself. Give 'em a commerce clause, they'll take a constitution.
  • I think I need to put up a post announcing that anyone who seems to think that the U.S. government is not in fact limited by the Constitution will be summarily ignored. The fact that it does not set the limits you want or that the document is not interpreted in the way you think is most valid, has no bearing on whether the government is in fact limited.
  • The Constitution isn't valid because I never signed it!

    Okay, just teasing. :)
  • Cascadian
    This is just foolish. Sure, the commerce clause after Raich and whatever might be left after our unitary president is still limited by what the Gov can get away with. This is such a watered down definition as to be meaningless. I'm a Statist by the fact that I'm not an anarchist. You impact your own credibility here.

    Small Gov, Limited Gov? In my world that only applies to the Federal Government in light of the tenth amendment. Surely, living in a condo or closed community, with it's regulations on noise levels or which kinds of curtains, is also intrusive government on the micro scale. Should 'L'ibertarians fight these forms of gov as well? No, of course not. We also have freedom of association and choice. If we brought this to the State level, you may find a state that is an anarchist dream. You would also find everything else, which, though it wouldn't guarantee a minarchist gov where ever you might desire to live, would at least give you options.
  • Patrick
    I disagree. I think you're ignoring several key points on the size of governance issue.

    Large governments require a much large bureaucracy to support, which allows a greater potential for misuse.
    Large governments have greater market distorting abilities.
    Large governments have better abilities to create disparities and individuals to corrupt the system without it being caught.

    Fascism is expensive. Bureaucracy is expensive. When a government is large, both can be maintained. Your hypothetical small government might pass millions of laws a year, but if they are small enough enforcement will be impossible. And in such a case practical liberalism exists in fact for the people. When a government is smaller it is easier to citizens to watch for corruption and find what is missing and use the people to fix the system. It's much easier to account for 1 million dollars then it is to track 1 trillion.

    The fact that you can hypothetically create a situation in which a larger government can be more liberalizing then a smaller government. What we're discussing is potentiality. A large government has a greater potentiality for being deliberalizing then a small government. If we shrunk the government in half today. Today. The massive deliberalizing military campaigns our government engages in could not occur. Iraq could not occur without a massive military budget. If your government is small enough the officials might go, "We can't afford the drug war, because we have to provide all these other essential services first, that this thing can't be done." Or "We can't afford NASA, so let's liberalize these markets so that the private sector can do it if they want." And so on.

    The other thing about small governments, is that they are much less reliable against economic swings, and while in boom years the government may wish to spend like crazy during a down turn many of the large government programs will have to be cut and pressure for reform will be higher. For instance, a government might have a massive tax burden on the rich to pay for free health care for everyone, but it can't maintain that in down years, and so the program will have to be abandoned and the tax abandoned as well. When a government is large, it can sustain itself through these dusk years by shifting the burden of debts around and cutting useful programs to sustain popular ones.
    ==
    Perhaps by showing ways in which small governments specifically are able to be more deliberalizing then large governments, in a way a large government would have difficulty doing as well, I might be more convinced. Like, I know small town governments can be corrupt, but if a large government was corrupt in the same way, it'd still be bad. And we see this by looking at any of the one party and/or machine states, which are just as bad as the small town guys but they have access to much more power and so the effect is more dangerous to more people.
  • Mikk
    Patrick, in Hong Kong and Singapore you have small taxes, but government is micromanaging business (and not only business) very much. They have good tools too. In Hong Kong land is owned by government and by renting it out (it gives them additional revenues), they can actually decide who and in conditions can do business there. They have very "central planners" attitude.

    Maybe it is cultural issue, but if you think that there are 4 Chinese states in the world (Peoples Republic,Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong), only one of them is communist state, but none of them are liberal democracies.
  • Who mentioned fascism? Consider the fact that Social Security, which is fabulously expensive, requires relatively little administrative overhead.
  • Patrick
    Wow, sorry for the incomplete sentences, was in a hurry to respond and should have edited more.
  • BradTaylor
    Very smartifying.

    I think you need to be careful, though, in considering exactly how minarchists are giving away the game. I too worry that an appropriate level of government will mutate into excessive government. The minimal state might not be stable, but this has nothing to do with political philosophy: it's not the public goods justification of the minimal state that produces a slippery slope leading to statism as we know it, but the logic of politics (public choice problems, expressive voting, etc). For mine, the justifiability and stability of any level of government are completely independent.
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