Comments on: More on Transparency & Generality

By: ASdn

ASdn — Thu, 01 Mar 2007 19:29:48 +0000

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By: Club Troppo » Scandinavian social democracy — not the road to serfdom after all

Tue, 14 Nov 2006 07:57:23 +0000

[...] Classical liberals tend to be less worried about rule-governed transfers than they are about other attempts to correct market ‘unfairness.’ For example, Cato’s Will Wilkinson suggests that, "The cause of classical liberalism as a really existing possibility for political reform has been harmed by bundling free markets with a ban on transfers" because it made makes enemies of those who supported transfers on the grounds of justice. [...]

By: Club Troppo » Selling out

Club Troppo » Selling out — Sat, 09 Sep 2006 14:08:17 +0000

[...] At Catallaxy Jason Soon favours Murray’s model. Introducing a universal cash grant or negative income tax would pave the way for "a vast slash and burn exercise for the remaining welfare and labour market regulatory machines to facilitate a freer labour market…" For libertarians like Jason, it’s the possibility of finally being able to set the market free that justifies the large income transfers. At the Fly Bottle, Will Wilkinson suggests that: [...]

By: How to Affect Change at Genuine Incorporated

How to Affect Change at Genuine Incorporated — Mon, 12 Jun 2006 02:41:58 +0000

[...] And to bring it down to the managerial level, political philosophy, thinking of a manager as a politician: Governments use coercion to make things happen. Government coercion can be legitimate, but it has to meet certain conditions. One of the traditional conditions is that a majority of the citizens who are going to be coerced, or a majority of their representatives, have to agree to it. However, if policies are structured so that we can’t see whether or how we are being coerced, then we can’t freely endorse them in the democratic process. So those policies fail the test of legitimacy. [...]

By: L

Mon, 03 Apr 2006 02:09:53 +0000

Jacob T Levy: Are you saying that Murray and Friedman’s superficial differences are important, even though an income tax could easily obliterate the differences? (Considering that inflation is ambiguous over 50 years, Murray’s plan probably falls in the range of inflation-adjusted versions of Friedman’s plan.)

Maybe the superficial difference could affect political viability, but I don’t think there’s a difference in terms of discouraging work or the potential for fraud. Either way, it seems to me that it’s just about unreported income, so if the marginal tax rates are the same, the potentials are the same (and probably the same as today).

I’d like to point out that the EITC can have an effective marginal income tax rate as high as 70%. In practice, people who have it together enough to apply for the EITC are ambitious enough to escape it.

By: Jacob T. Levy

Jacob T. Levy — Mon, 27 Mar 2006 17:43:14 +0000

Friedman’s negative income tax is a bit different. On the one hand, it’s a lot cheaper, because it’s means-tested. On the other hand, it’s got all the disadvantages of means-testing: it’s narrowly targeted and hence unpopular, it’s got the potential to penalize work (unlike the EITC and unlike UBI), it either is open to a lot of fraud or requires a welfare-and-social-work level of intrusive bureaucracy to monitor eligibility.

By: Aria PN » Free Market with Transfers

Aria PN » Free Market with Transfers — Mon, 27 Mar 2006 17:42:21 +0000

[...] That’s the solution I was proposing in my last post. Free market to get the most benefits and transfers to redistribute them accordingly. One important issue about redistribution is generality versus transparency. Do we redistribute the benefits universally or selectively but transparently? Will Wilkinson expands more on this. This problem in particular is really evident in Indonesia: Part of the issue here is a big principle-agent/incentive compatibility problem between representatives and the citizens they represent. Politicians want to get re-elected. If they can subsidize interest group A at group B’s expense without group B really noticing due to the hidden transfer, then that will sound like a real winner to a politician. Which is just to say that the incentives politicians face encourage them to violate the very conditions of transparency and public justification that make their coercive powers legitimate. [...]

By: L

Mon, 27 Mar 2006 16:32:58 +0000

Will Wilkinson: I think the name is McArdle–only one C.

Jacob T Levy writes:
“I think it might turn out to be very important that a self-identified libertarian of Murray’s prominence is coming out for unconditional basic income”

I see a lot of people say this and I’m confused: isn’t Milton Friedman a prominent libertarian whose been saying this for 50 years? Is he any less prominent or libertarian than Murray? Anyhow, history provides no reason to expect that one person saying one thing, even with a lot of coverage to be remembered 6 months later.

By: Will Wilkinson

Will Wilkinson — Mon, 27 Mar 2006 15:27:26 +0000

Jacob, I went to AEI to see Murray speak on Friday, and bought the book, and I see no mention whatever of the UBI debate. What is interesting is that Murray is pushes his Plan as a specifically libertarian idea. The conservatives at the AEI talk (Irving Kristol especially, who said, basically, incredulously “Surely you don’t want a government with this little power!”) seemed to be dismayed at the prospect of banning social policy as carrot and stick social control.

By: The Burden of Proof

The Burden of Proof — Mon, 27 Mar 2006 15:20:14 +0000

WW On Liberalism…

Will Wilkinson continues his strategic critique of the bundling of free markets with militantism against transfers. Tyler Cowen got the ball running by quoting Will’s initial comment over at Asymmetrical Information. I too have some concerns regarding…

By: Jacob T. Levy

Jacob T. Levy — Mon, 27 Mar 2006 15:15:16 +0000

Other than the parenthetical question about Freeman– to which the answer is ‘no, he’s not’–I agree entirely. It’s been an unfortuante result of the prominence of the Rawls-Nozick debate that so many people think that the only real question is whether or not transfers are permissible; and in real-world politics terms I suspect that something similar has held. I think it might turn out to be very important that a self-identified libertarian of Murray’s prominence is coming out for unconditional basic income [has anyone read enough of the new book to know whether he seems aware of the UBI debate in pol. philosophy?] At least it will shake some assumptions up.

By: Transparency in Free Markets at Genuine Incorporated

Transparency in Free Markets at Genuine Incorporated — Sat, 25 Mar 2006 00:38:10 +0000

[...] Will Wilkinson proposes an interesting hypothesis on free market liberalism: For those of us, like Murray and me, who are Hayek/Friedman/Buchanan-style classical liberals as opposed to Rand/Rothbard-style libertarians, things like generality and transparency matter. There is no natural rights beef against transfers per se, but a fundamentally liberal beef against institutional forms that undermine the conditions for liberal legitimacy. If the conditions of liberal legitimacy are met, then the result is the free-market, minimal welfare state. This is a “libertarian” result according to the vernacular, if not according to orthodoxy. It is surely a classical liberal result. (Is Samuel Freeman right that Rand/Rothbard libertarianism is not really a kind of liberalism?) [...]

By: John Thacker

John Thacker — Thu, 23 Mar 2006 18:49:44 +0000

Javier—

Your point is fair, in that Sweden, while better than France, is no ideal. That’s why I switched my argument to an “ideal libertarian Sweden.” Would it be preferable or not to libertarians, and does it depend on the type of libertarian?

There is, I think, a fair case that while transfer payments may lead to social unrest, but as a counter efficient transfer payments (negative income tax versus minimum wage, non-distortionary taxes) may lead to a net higher level of transfers due to their very efficiency. Inefficiency puts a limit on the amount of transfers one can do. So it’s entirely possible that an emphasis on efficiency, market-compatible, liberal transfers would lead to more efficient transfers, but at a higher level than currently.

By: Robert Schwartz

Robert Schwartz — Thu, 23 Mar 2006 16:39:15 +0000

"This package deal has influenced people who think justice requires transfers to eschew free markets." The crelationship between ideas is backwards. The socialist (n/k/a liberal) begins with the premise that the state, run by philosopher-kings, will have all of the wisdom, and that it will produce perfect justice (as if). tranfer payments are justified by the wisdom and magnanimity of the state. All your base are belong to us. Mickey Kaus claims tranfer payments lead to social unrest, and I think he has the better argument.

By: Javier

Javier — Thu, 23 Mar 2006 14:45:59 +0000

Consider Sweden. Sweden’s education system is set up as a pure voucher system. Its labor market is relatively free, unlike, say, France.

I would disagree here. Yes, Sweden isn’t as bad as France with respect to labor market regulation, but it’s still pretty bad. The OECD has a weighted average of indicators for employment protection legislation, rated 0 to 6, with higher values representing stricter legislation. Sweden comes in at 2.5, while France is 2.8 or so. The United States in contrast is about 0.7. And the voucher system in Sweden is admirable in many ways, but private schools are also heavily regulated there.