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	<title>Comments on: Growth and Economic Folk Morality</title>
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	<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/</link>
	<description>The Sweet Release of Reason</description>
	<pubDate>Sun, 20 Jul 2008 18:12:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Will Wilkinson / The Fly Bottle &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Why Do Economists Care About Inequality?</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-22767</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Wilkinson / The Fly Bottle &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Why Do Economists Care About Inequality?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Aug 2006 15:11:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-22767</guid>
		<description>[...] What leaps to mind is that economists must be&#160;impressed with diminishing marginal utility (DMU) arguments for redistribution. But this is not qua economist. Orthodox utility theory is not in the business of interpersonal utility comparison, so there is no&#160;language in which to say that overall utility has been increased by redistribution.&#160;There&#8217;s just one guy&#8217;s utility going down, another guy&#8217;s going down, and no way to&#160;say whether one compensates for the other. (This is one of the reason some economists are attracted to happiness research: they want a language in which to do principled interpersonal utility comparisons.) But, as I have noted in the past,&#160;when economists have anything interesting to say, it&#8217;s&#160;usually because they are applying&#160;what I like to call&#160;economic folk morality, which&#160;plays fast and loose with&#160;the various senses of utility.&#160;Economists qua&#160;amateur&#160;moral philosophers&#160;in my experience are very impressed with DMU&#160;justifications for redistribution. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] What leaps to mind is that economists must be&nbsp;impressed with diminishing marginal utility (DMU) arguments for redistribution. But this is not qua economist. Orthodox utility theory is not in the business of interpersonal utility comparison, so there is no&nbsp;language in which to say that overall utility has been increased by redistribution.&nbsp;There&#8217;s just one guy&#8217;s utility going down, another guy&#8217;s going down, and no way to&nbsp;say whether one compensates for the other. (This is one of the reason some economists are attracted to happiness research: they want a language in which to do principled interpersonal utility comparisons.) But, as I have noted in the past,&nbsp;when economists have anything interesting to say, it&#8217;s&nbsp;usually because they are applying&nbsp;what I like to call&nbsp;economic folk morality, which&nbsp;plays fast and loose with&nbsp;the various senses of utility.&nbsp;Economists qua&nbsp;amateur&nbsp;moral philosophers&nbsp;in my experience are very impressed with DMU&nbsp;justifications for redistribution. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Tom Richardson</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-7506</link>
		<dc:creator>Tom Richardson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2006 01:05:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-7506</guid>
		<description>RE: "preference satisfaction doesn’t make us “happy” but it almost always doesn’t make us less happy".
In very large measure, much of the happy consumption of goods in the modern era does (or will) make us individually and collectively less happy. 
The long term consequences (or maybe not so long term) of the collective choices/preference we enjoy today because economic growth has expanded both our numbers (population able to make choices/exercise preferences) and our opportunities for more “happiness” is (or will) lead us unintentionally to less happiness, collectively and individually. 
Proof based even one increasingly “safe” assumption: It is true that the negative externalities of burning fossil fuels in more cars in more countries is (or will) indeed melting the polar ice caps thereby leading to increased flooding of coastal lowlands and is (or will) increasing ocean surface temperatures thereby the frequency and/or severity of hurricanes. 
These unhappy unintended consequences of globally impacting externalities result from the aggregation of our individual choices/preferences when we go out shopping for more “happiness”. It is precisely these choices which power the engine of economic growth. Our choices seem at the moment to expand, individually, our happiness; but, in the end will they not leave us one and all less happy?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RE: &#8220;preference satisfaction doesn’t make us “happy” but it almost always doesn’t make us less happy&#8221;.<br />
In very large measure, much of the happy consumption of goods in the modern era does (or will) make us individually and collectively less happy.<br />
The long term consequences (or maybe not so long term) of the collective choices/preference we enjoy today because economic growth has expanded both our numbers (population able to make choices/exercise preferences) and our opportunities for more “happiness” is (or will) lead us unintentionally to less happiness, collectively and individually.<br />
Proof based even one increasingly “safe” assumption: It is true that the negative externalities of burning fossil fuels in more cars in more countries is (or will) indeed melting the polar ice caps thereby leading to increased flooding of coastal lowlands and is (or will) increasing ocean surface temperatures thereby the frequency and/or severity of hurricanes.<br />
These unhappy unintended consequences of globally impacting externalities result from the aggregation of our individual choices/preferences when we go out shopping for more “happiness”. It is precisely these choices which power the engine of economic growth. Our choices seem at the moment to expand, individually, our happiness; but, in the end will they not leave us one and all less happy?</p>
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		<title>By: Butter</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-7135</link>
		<dc:creator>Butter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Mar 2006 19:55:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-7135</guid>
		<description>"But economic folk morality is false for at least three reasons. First, preference satisfaction does not entail happiness. It is possible to want and get things that will make us miserable."

I've been thinking about your claims for a while, especially during the spat with DeLong.  No, preference satisfaction does not make us "happy" in the absolute sense, but it normally doesn't make us less happy.   It is in fact "possible to want and get things that will make us miserable"... sure, occasionally, but not in a systematic way.  That would violate economist's sacred rationality assumption.  Sure, people are drunks and druggies, etc., but this isn't really useful for developing a general model because these are normally exceptions.  

This is why you get the confusion.  You are correct that preference satisfaction doesn't make us "happy" but it almost always doesn't make us less happy, which can be a moral case for growth.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;But economic folk morality is false for at least three reasons. First, preference satisfaction does not entail happiness. It is possible to want and get things that will make us miserable.&#8221;</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve been thinking about your claims for a while, especially during the spat with DeLong.  No, preference satisfaction does not make us &#8220;happy&#8221; in the absolute sense, but it normally doesn&#8217;t make us less happy.   It is in fact &#8220;possible to want and get things that will make us miserable&#8221;&#8230; sure, occasionally, but not in a systematic way.  That would violate economist&#8217;s sacred rationality assumption.  Sure, people are drunks and druggies, etc., but this isn&#8217;t really useful for developing a general model because these are normally exceptions.  </p>
<p>This is why you get the confusion.  You are correct that preference satisfaction doesn&#8217;t make us &#8220;happy&#8221; but it almost always doesn&#8217;t make us less happy, which can be a moral case for growth.</p>
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		<title>By: Gil</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6804</link>
		<dc:creator>Gil</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2006 03:56:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6804</guid>
		<description>Um... I think you meant "The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth".

If you meant to accuse him of confusing moral and economic consequences (which I don't think you did), you probably shouldn't do it by misnaming his book.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Um&#8230; I think you meant &#8220;The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth&#8221;.</p>
<p>If you meant to accuse him of confusing moral and economic consequences (which I don&#8217;t think you did), you probably shouldn&#8217;t do it by misnaming his book.</p>
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		<title>By: Will Wilkinson</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6802</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Wilkinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2006 18:20:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6802</guid>
		<description>I made a special effort to say "orthodox neoclassical"!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I made a special effort to say &#8220;orthodox neoclassical&#8221;!</p>
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		<title>By: conchis</title>
		<link>http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6801</link>
		<dc:creator>conchis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2006 18:11:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.willwilkinson.net/flybottle/2006/02/27/growth-and-economic-folk-morality/#comment-6801</guid>
		<description>I'm being pedantic, but the statement that: 

"utility just is a measure of the satisfaction of an agent’s preferences, and it is a logical consequence of the definition of terms that an increase in income leads to the choice of a more preferred combination of goods, thereby increasing utility"

isn't quite true. By allowing for regret, it's possible to specify preferences such that more choice leads to less preference satisfaction (a la Barry Schwartz - though I personally think he pushes this idea rather too far.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m being pedantic, but the statement that: </p>
<p>&#8220;utility just is a measure of the satisfaction of an agent’s preferences, and it is a logical consequence of the definition of terms that an increase in income leads to the choice of a more preferred combination of goods, thereby increasing utility&#8221;</p>
<p>isn&#8217;t quite true. By allowing for regret, it&#8217;s possible to specify preferences such that more choice leads to less preference satisfaction (a la Barry Schwartz - though I personally think he pushes this idea rather too far.)</p>
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