Justice: Bigger than the State, Smaller than the World

by Will Wilkinson on August 6, 2005

David Gordon has an interesting discussion of Nagel’s new Philosophy & Public Affairs article on “The Problem of Global Justice.” Apparently, Nagel defends Rawl’s refusal to extend the two principles beyond the bounds of the nation state. I had always thought that those, such as Pogge, who attempt to extend Rawls to the global limit simply failed to truly understand Rawls’s contractarian logic of reciprocity and mutual benefit. The possibility of political obligation is a function of shared partcipation in the cooperative enterprse for mutual advantage. Those outside our system of cooperation who are doing poorly cannot have a claim on those inside our system who are doing well simply because they are outside of our system. Neverthteless, Rawls’s stipulation of a closed economic system and closed borders is not even a useful abstraction for the purposes of ideal theory. It’s a disastrous distortion of socio-political reality. There is not intelligble sense in which “our” system of cooperation is coextensive with the borders of our nation-state.

Here is what Gordon says Nagel says:

In like fashion, Nagel holds, citizens of a nation are bound together. They share the obligation to obey their country’s laws; and, if they live in a democracy, they share responsibility for enacting these laws. In Rousseau’s term, they form the “general will.” Undue inequality interferes with these common bonds; hence we have egalitarian obligations to our fellow citizens. These we do not owe to citizens of other countries, since we are not bound to them in the same way. Justice, in this view, is not a “cosmopolitan” virtue, owed to anyone in the world; it is a “political” virtue that applies only to those subject to a common sovereignty. “The important point for our purposes is that Rawls believes that this moral principle against arbitrary inequalities is not a principle of universal application. . . . Rather, in his theory the objection to arbitrary inequalities gets a foothold only because of the societal context. What is objectionable is that we should be fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions that generate such arbitrary inequalities. . . . One might even say that we are all participants in the general will. A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage” (pp. 127–28).

Now, I hope Nagel is not using “general will” language in any strict Rousseauian sense, because I’m pretty sure that Rawls does not accept this, and doesn’t get at the point of Rawls’s argument for democracy. The point, somewhat deflated, is easy enough to understand, though. Obviously, two American citizens are tied together through their common relationship to a particular set of democratic processes and system of coercive public adminstration in a way that an American and a Canadian are not. Americans participate in the same elections, send their taxes to the same address, and drive on roads funded out of the same bank account, etc. Insofar as my tax rate, and the roads I’m driving on are a function of my participation in the same (system of) elections as other citzens, then I and another American might be said to bound together a special way. But Nagel seems to understate or miss a large problem when he says that “A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage.”

No doubt I’ll have to read Nagel’s paper, but it’s not clear to me what being part of a “general will” adds that both legitimates the state, and reinforces state boundaries as the proper bounds of justice. (Why have lots of little general wills, and not just one big one?) In any case, one of Rawls’s problems is that even if the boundaries of the state and the conditions for citizenship enclose and define one particular kind of cooperation for mutual advantage, the totality of morally relevant cooperative relationships are by no means contained by borders and shared citizenship.

John Tomasi likes to tell a story about a Martian anthropologist in a spaceship above Earth who is looking at a political map of our orb. (I’m embellishing on John’s story, so don’t blame him for stupid stuff I say.) Let’s call it Glork to avoid the alien pronoun problem. Now, Glork is totally baffled about why Earthlings are so obsessed by these imaginary lines, because when Glork (with Glork’s tentacle) presses the button on Glork’s viewscreen to show the patterns of mutually advantageous cooperation among Earthlings, the relevance on political boundaries almost disappears. The geographical regions with the wealthiest and most physically robust beings areas are those where the patterns of cooperation are least constrained by political boundaries. Those places where cooperation is most limited to the inside of a region enclosed by political lines (as Rawls’s closed system assumption requires) are the places where no compassionate Martian would wish an Earthling to live.

Now, suppose Glork presses a button to light up regions in different colors depending on their system of governance. Glork finds that the inhabitants of “liberal democracies” are more likely than inhabitants of regions governed by different systems to be engaged in systematic relations of cooperation with people outside their political unit.

Now, Glork aside, isn’t this a big problem for Rawls/Nagel. The political system that they are eager to defend and justify is precisely the system where relations of cooperation are LEAST contained by borders and principles of co-citizenship. The American “general will” accounts for surpassingly little of American relationships of cooperative mutual advantage. Indeed, states are an enormous impediment to more extensive cross-border cooperation. On thing to be said in favor of liberal democratic states is that they are less of an impediment to cooperation than other political systems. Perhaps state-like jurisdictions are necessary for the stability of ongoing cooperation between people living in far-flung regions. Let’s just allow that that’s true. But if justice is the “first virtue” of a society, and a society is a fair scheme of cooperation for mutual advantantage, then I am in society with the people in Japan who made my computer. We traded on fair terms, and we’re both better off. It seems just boneheaded to argue that the principles of justice apply can’t apply extranationally simply because the Japanese don’t vote in our elections and fund our highway system, etc.

But this line of thinking just doensn’t get you to Pogge-like global justice, either. The principles of justice applies to people who are part of a shared system of cooperation. If I’m not part a shared system of cooperation with the Japanese and the Canadians, well I’ll be damned. But the problem with folks, like wretchedly poor Africans, who globalist crytpo-Rawlsians want to send first-world money to on difference principle grounds, is precisely that they aren’t sufficiently a part of a shared system of cooperation with themselves or the outside world. THAT IS WHY THEY ARE SO POOR. But that is also why contractualist logic implies that they don’t have claims on the rest of us.

So, the contractualist logic of cooperation, reciprocity, shared benefits and burdens, identifies networks of trade as the main locus of a proper theory of justice, not the nation state or the whole wide world. Such a theory will need to be cosmopolitan, polycentric, and post-statist to track the moral reality of a globally interconnected world.

  • Damn - I should have read Gordon's article before posting. He touched on the same conflict I noticed between the difference principle and the legitimacy of a sovereign political entity. I especially liked his last paragraph:

    Nagel could not respond that if people refused to institute the difference principle, they would act unjustly. The entire point of his defense of the principle is that only if people wish to establish certain kinds of social bonds have they a reason to limit inequality. Absent this wish, Nagel offers no grounds at all for people to subject themselves to the difference principle.
  • So I'm coming into this discussion a bit late, but one thing I've noticed no one has talked about yet is how the veil of ignorance fits into all of this. The veil seems to me the linchpin of Rawl's framework - the intuition pump that does all of the work.

    If so, why should we allow the content of existing political circumstances to be brought behind the veil? So what if I'm not currently part of a shared system of cooperation with a poor African? That's not the poor African's fault. I'm sure both the African and I would prefer a system in which the wealthier one would be coerced into supporting the poorer one were neither of us to know to which position we'd be assigned prior to our birth. So if Rawl's argument goes through, why shouldn't it go through for this case as well? It is but an accident of birth that I was born here and not there.

    It may have been Will Baude who first brought this to my attention, and I'm sure I've blogged about it before, and I'm sure it's an elementary point made in any discussion about Rawls, but it seems that the main problem with his contractarianism is deciding exactly what knowledge we are allowed to bring behind the veil of ignorance. Some want more, some want less.

    Now, most likely the response will be something along the lines of: Rawls is only interested in Constitutional analysis or some such format which limits the contractarian bargain to nation states as they exist today. But shouldn't justice ultimately be concerned with ideal theory? So why should we care how political entities exist today? We could, if we wanted to, treat the entirety of Africa as if it was the 51st state (or give each country in Africa the status of an additional state). Sure, it would be expensive, and sure, Africans don't currently pay taxes to the U.S. government for public goods. But that can all change. Surely we can coercively force Africans to pay us tribute - er, taxes just as easily as we force our own.
  • Yup. Her general idea is right, but the execution is awful. Sweatshops are almost the worst imaginable example for her case. They are generally a positive symptom of the partial amelioration of the underlying disease. The relevant issue is what it is that explains the economic condition of countries in which working in a sweatshop is a great deal for workers. It's generally going to be a complex set of relationship between wealthier states, multilateral aid agencies, corporations, and the criminality/failure of the local state.

    I'm baffled why she treats this as a throwaway:

    "The poverty of the countryside that impels many people in developing countries to seek work in overcrowded cities. The export processing zones many governments have established where some of them find work, for example, are both consequences of a history of structural adjustment programs that many indebted governments have been pressured to implement by international financial institutions. The background conditions of the lives of these young workers today are partly a sedimented consequence of decisions and aggregated economic processes beginning three decades ago."

    What she calls "social structure" is pretty much what the NIE guys call an "institution." Hers is a better term, I think.
  • I do like this passage from the young paper:

    "Critics of the position that limits the scope of
    obligations of justice to common political membership, on the other hand, are right to
    argue that it is arbitrary to consider nation-state membership as a source of obligations of
    justice. Political communities have evolved in contingent and arbitrary ways more
    connected to power than moral right. People often stand in dense relationships of
    exchange and cooperate with others outside their political communities, and they rightly
    expect fair terms in these relationships."
  • Yeah, I don't think Young and I have a lot in common, but perhaps in this instance there is something, I'll definitely look at the paper. My own views were strongly influenced by my time at the Mercatus Center's Global Prosperity Initiative. "Social structural processes" are indeed the problem. We called them "institutions" in the New Institutional Economics sense, but perhaps the same thing?

    I think the first world has materially harmed the third world through aid regimes. But this is a problem of the design of political institutions. Politicians in wealthy countries can use support of aid to build domestic support, and because the people who are most harmed by the transfers have no domestic political voice, there is little political feedback for the negative consequences. Similarly, wealthy states use aid as a carrot/stick to get other states to do their bidding. This, too, is largely due to perverse incentives within domestic political institutions, but serves to prop up illegitimate regimes, and perpetuate oppression.

    I predict that "sweatshops", i.e., improved labor opportunities and conditions for the poor through trade, probably aren't going to be a good example of injustice.
  • timothy waligore
    By the way, Will, if I didn't know your politics better, I'd say that you and Iris Young have a lot in common. You probably disagree about... oh, everything... but she does suggest that global justice should focus not on political institutions but what she calls social structural processes. I can't believe you'd agree with her since she highlights the importance of the anti-sweatshop campaign, but here's a link to one of her pieces.

    http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/marionyoung.pdf
  • timothy waligore
    Will- How far would you take that? If bombs were being dropped instead of garbage, would you call it unjust? Or only immoral? You seem to believe in Humean circumstances of justice. But are such circumstances really a necessary condition for justice, or only a sufficient one? (I'm cribbing off Brian Barry here.) I am to take it that you do not believe the notion of justice can apply between generations, since we affect later generations like the weather. I'm not convinced that pollution invokes no issue of justice. More importantly than these contentious issues, do you agree with Hume (in Enquiry) that "Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never upon the highest provacation, make us feel the effects of their resentment, the necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatues, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restaint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right of property, exclusive of such arbitrary loard. Our intercourse with them could not be called society - which supposes a degree of equality - but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the other. What we covet, they must instantly resign."

    Do you mean something like Hume when you say "Each party has to be in a position to bargain, make agreements, and enforce them." Do you mean that they must have *moral* standing (be legitimate)? Or be an effective government? Or both?

    Finally, what is your notion of interaction or interdependence? I'm not sure what two or three notions you think Pogge is 'equivocating' between.
    Does any pair of persons within a country have such interaction and interdepedence?

    I do think you picking up on a criticism of Kant. Kant says that since the Earth is a bounded and not infinite, we have to comes to terms with each other at some point. But, as you said, that does not entail that each and every person must come to terms with each and every person across the globe.
  • Naw, Ricky won't do nothing but look for Cheetos.
  • Bill Korner
    Not in circumstances of justice is the WAY TO BE!

    Did you get that nucleaur explosion I asked Ricky Williams to send you?
  • Tim, Great stuff. First, I think mutual interaction is very important. If I'm flying an airplane over your country and dumping garbage on your head, and there's nothing you can or will ever do about it, and I will never hear from you, or be affected by you in any way, then we are not in the circumstances of justice. You are related to me like you're related to the weather. If something about your life is the effect of something I have caused, that's not interaction or interdependence.

    Second, I don't think even mutual "influence" is enough to put us in the circumstances of justice. Each party has to be in a position to bargain, make agreements, and enforce them. Statist bias leads to thinking of Cote D'Ivoire as a party to a social contract. But it's not. It is quite likely not a legitimate state, just a gang in control of land. That's why it's morally illegitimate to send aid to Cote D'Ivoire, the state, since it does not have moral standing. And the rulers of the people of the region stand in the way of those people entering fully into the circumstances of justice with folks outside the borders, by blocking (predating on) trade and reinforcing dependency.

    Pogge has to be careful not to equivocate on "global interdependence." There are relations of interdependence that extend across borders and around the globe. But it is not the case that any two people (or even any two economies) on the globe are in any sense interdependent.
  • timothy waligore
    Will, I'm wondering how you feel about Kant's idea that if we are unavoidably side by side others, and therefore likely to have conflicts with them over who owns what and the like, we can force them to leave the state of nature and enter into a civil condition with us. To some extent, this idea might work with global relations today, though presumably it would not require entering into a civil condition in the sense of a world state, but being otherwise regulated by law or principles (there are three levels of public right). Your talk of trade flows reminded if Kant, but I would guess your favored version of the social contact relies on choice or benefits rather than the way Kant puts it? (Mind you, this is not how all 'Kantians' would put it.)

    I thought of this because I wonder how much of lot of criticism of Pogge depends on assuming a certain vision of the social contract. Here's some stuff I've been reading in Pogge recently, if anyone is curious and does not have him in front of them.

    In Realizing Rawls (1989), pp. 240-1, Pogge surmises that Rawls would agree with Kant's formulation that there is an obligation to leave a lawless condition and form just institutions “among human beings . . . who cannot avoid mutually influencing one another.” In absence of actual interaction, and if interaction is avoidable, then there is no mandate to interact and thus form a global structure. Pogge says, “I concede that a criterion of justice for domestic institutions would be sufficient if modern states were indeed closed schemes.” Pogge seems to say that there is no clear duty for isolated societies to establish interaction. Pogge says for Rawls, “there are grounds for bringing his contractarian device to bear on the global plane only if there is significant global interdependence.” If there is not global interdependence, and it is possible to avoid mutually influencing each other, our theory can be concerned only with domestic justice.
    Pogge notes that other cosmopolitans like Charles Beitz have expressed the fear that this will lead to a status quo bias. If principles of global justice require massive redistribution, but only apply when there is interaction, then states have an incentive to isolate themselves and not establish ties to other societies. Pogge says that he fails “to see this danger, for whether the members of different societies can or cannot avoid mutually influencing one another is, though an empirical matter, surely not up to them. At this stage in world history we cannot realistically avoid international interaction, and so the members of rich societies have no incentive to exploit the fact that the criterion of global justice would not apply if societies were self-contained.” Pogge says that this all is “entirely academic, since all agree that there is and will be extensive global interdependence.”
  • About harm to the poor. I agree (1)-(3) are all problems and cause harm. Pogge's inference then ought to simply be that we stop doing (1)-(3). And then it's hard to see how redistribution to these countries can be anything other than another instance of (3), exacerbating the prior harm.
  • Javier
    When people across boundaries trade, say, there are gains from trade, and the division of the gains is a matter of distributive justice.

    That's correct and I see no reason why Blake would disagree. Blake's claim is simply that fellow citizens have special distributive duties towards one another.

    Doesn't the legitimacy of coercive redistribution depends on the prior legitmacy of state coercion.

    That's right: Blake is assuming that some kinds of coercive redistribution are acceptable. I don't see that as an especially egregious assumption.

    Pogge's just factually wrong about the harm to the global poor.

    Well, maybe. There are several ways in which Western countries might harm the global poor. Pogge specifies several possibilites: (1) Western corporations often bribe the officials of developing countries, contributing to the inferior quality of their legal and political institutions, (2) Western countries buy oil from corrupt and despotic governments, which reinforces the "resource-curse" of those countries, (3) Western governments and creditors provide loans and other forms of financial support to these same corrupt governments. I would throw in as a possibility intellectual property regimes that produce net transfers from poor countries to rich ones. So while I don't think Pogge has established that either the global "basic structure" or Western countries in particular significantly harm the global poor, I also don't think we can easily dismiss the possibility.
  • Matt, thanks for the pointer on the Heath paper. I don't let not reading papers and not having access to books from stop me from making sweeping pronouncements about them!
  • Bill Korner
    Pogge. Uh hum. Boy do I resent his lame ass having a cushy job at Columbia or wherever it is. Sheesh.
  • Matt
    Hi Will,

    I have a fair amount of agreement w/ what you say so won't try to hash out the points of disagreement on blog comments, especially while I'm away from my books (always a convenient excuess, I know!) but, one point I want to bring up, since I think it's a very common misunderstanding of Rawls, namely the "closed society" provision- the _only_ point of that is for the "strains of commitment" argument. The idea is that if people in the original position knew they could leave their socity for others they'd be more willing to gamble, so we assume society is closed. Whether this is _merely_ cooking the books in favor of the two principles of justice is debatable (it clearly looks more like it than other parts of the original position set-up) but, it plays no role, even as an assumption, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, even in the later stages. (At the very least it plays no role at the legislative stage or byond, and I think it probably plays no role in the constitutional stage.) So, this is an "assumption" only in the set-up of the original position and at no other time. (This explains why it has no role at all in the Law of Peoples, for example.) (I've only looked at Tomasi's book briefly but I think he gets this part wrong. Whether it hurts his over-all argument that he misunderstands what Rawls is up to here or not I can't say.)
    By the way, what is clearly the best easily avaliable paper on Rawls on global justice is a yet unpublished paper by Peter Heath, avaliable here: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~jheath/rawls.pdf
    Even if you don't agree with him, it's good to read since unlike most people he actually knows what's going on in the Law of Peoples and how this relates to the rest of Rawls's work, unlike the majority of commentors (including Pogge!)
  • Javier, Good points all. But, first, principles of justice aren't all principles of the justice of distribution. Second, principles of market cooperation are principles of distribution. When people across boundaries trade, say, there are gains from trade, and the division of the gains is a matter of distributive justice. No? But it is not at all clear what this has to do with participation in a common coercive legal structure.

    Naturally, I don't buy Blake's claim (if that's right) that the legitimacy of state coercion depends on redistribution. In fact, I don't understand it. Doesn't the legitimacy of coercive redistribution depends on the prior legitmacy of state coercion. I'll have to check out the Blake paper.

    Pogge's just factually wrong about the harm to the global poor. And the claim about compensation is clearly an abandonment of contractualist logic.
  • Javier
    Good post. But let me quibble with some of your points.

    (1) Consider the following rebuttal, adapted from Michael Blake's paper "Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy". Principles of distributive justice do not apply to all networks of cooperation, but rather only to coercive legal and political structures. If individuals are subject to coercive laws and institutions, these laws and institutions must be justifiable to each of them in virtue of their interference with people's autonomy. But in order for coercive institutions to be justifiable, they must redistribute property or wealth according to some kind of egalitarian criteria, such as the difference principle. Yet because the peoples of the world don't operate under shared coercive structures, principles of distributive justice aren't justified beyond those structures, which happen to be coterminous with nation-states.

    Mathias Risse uses the example of Basel in Switzerland to illustrate this point. Basel is economically integrated with France and Germany. Yet Switzerland rightly enforces its own laws in Basel because economic relationships fail to undermine the claim that membership in a shared coercive structure is or should be people's primary political identity.

    For the full argument, see Blake's article in Philosophy and Public Affairs.

    (2) But this line of thinking just doensn't get you to Pogge-like global justice, either.

    My memory might be a little rusty, but I recall that, according to Pogge, we have distributive duties to the global poor because of the harm our political and economic practices inflict on them, not because we share a cooperative structure with them. Thus, if our practices truly do harm the global poor, then we must compensate them regardless of whether we have a regular cooperative relationship.
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