Wouldn’t the “reasonable rejecter” probably accept the principle,

(1) If it turns out that there are wealth inequalities that (somehow) cause those with less to feel that their status is threatend causing them sufficient unhappiness AND I happen to be one of the wealthy ones, then I should accept some transfer to them as long as its done in accordance with the rule of law and this policy doesn’t screw up the economy too bad.

but decisively reject the principle,

(2) If it turns out that there are two races one of which has historically enslaved the other — with current poorer members of the enslaving race compensating for their relative-poverty-caused feelings of inferiority by loathing and harming the enslaved race — AND I am a member of the enslaved race, then I should accept a tax on me to make those poor white folks feel better.

??

(3) If their are wealth inequalities that make the less well-off feel that their status is threatened AND I happen to be less well-off, then I should get over my feelings of inadequacy and lesser respect rather than making demands on the very wealthy IF the costs of taxation to their happiness even slightly exceeds the costs of my getting over it.

than (1) above??

No.

It’s the “unreasonable rejecter” who prefers (1) to (3).

Now you know.

But, even if 99% of people accept (1) for themselves, I prefer a world that respects the choice of the 1% to reject the transfer (and of the others who don’t want to force them) over one that forcibly imposes these transfers upon them.

If you think wanting these transfers is so reasonable, why wouldn’t you expect them to take place through a voluntary process? Surely it wouldn’t take much more than someone like you explaining to thim how reasonable it is for them to agree, right?

And organizing lots of people voluntarily, and making their transfers contingent on some threshold being reached, has become relativley cheap.

Is there a good reason to prefer the coercive regime over the voluntary one other than to satisfy some irrational, destructive, impulse to punish those who have achieved more success than others?

Oh and if we’re counting hedons, I think we should factor in the unhappiness that the coercive regime causes people like me, who would prefer that the autonomy of others is respected.

When you say that I formulated the principles in too specific terms, are you just saying that they are more specific then the kind Scanlon uses? If that’s true (I’m not convinced), I disagree with Scanlon and would defend my version of his views over his.

I don’t know about Scanlon’s politics. Is he a libertarian or is it just that you think he should be given his views as you understand them?

Its very dubious and highly disputed that respecting autonomy requires not taxing high incomes more than low incomes (for whatever reason). The thesis that the motive of allieviating suffering from relative income deprivation makes the taxation especially anti-autonomy is way out. Also I have argued all over this blog that an individual’s [relative] autonomy should be evaluated by looking at the whole range of choices he/she faces and how attractive those are compared to others’ (in his/her view). I suggest that this is a much more meaningful view of autonomy than one that sees it as having ones rights as side-constraints respected.

Will: You originally said “it is cheap to equivocate between the desire for status and the desire for relative position in the income distribution.” But then you turn around and re-write my principles in terms of “contingent preferences for relative income.” You surely agree that that is a different question! It may be your question, but it’s not mine (or Layard’s, I think) and I can’t see how yours is more useful except to make your point. To say that the preferences are “contingent” (upon the individual’s choice I think you mean) itself begs an important questions. To describe them as for “relative income” avoids taking stock of the real preferences at stake including (a) not to be see oneself as less worthy because of lesser buying power, (b) not to suffer from lesser social status that comes from being known to have less wealth, (c) to be able to confer benefits on others and perform other social functions that require sufficient relative income, (d) to have more choices about what sort of employment to accept and perhaps to be an employer instead of an employee, and a host of other reasons. No one has a preference for higher relative income PER SE! If that is really what Layard thinks, then that makes him a strawman. (So why waste all this time debunking him.) All these ills are consequences of having a lower relative income. This does raise the interesting issue of what we are trying to do when we describe agents in terms of their “preferences”, itself a word that makes them sound relatively trivial. (“I ‘prefer’ that there not be genocide in the Sudan.”)

When you say that I formulated the principles in too specific terms, are you just saying that they are more specific then the kind Scanlon uses? If that’s true (I’m not convinced), I disagree with Scanlon and would defend my version of his views over his.

I don’t know about Scanlon’s politics. Is he a libertarian or is it just that you think he should be given his views as you understand them? I’m pretty sure he’s not a libertarian.

It’s very dubious and highly disputed that respecting autonomy requires not taxing high incomes more than low incomes (for whatever reason). The thesis that the motive of alleviating suffering from relative income deprivation makes the taxation especially anti-autonomy is way out. (You seem to think Scanlon would be onboard here. I strongly doubt it.)

Also, as I have argued all over this blog, an individual’s [relative] autonomy should be evaluated by looking at the whole range of choices he/she faces and how attractive those are compared to others’ choices (in his/her view). I suggest that this is a much more meaningful view of autonomy than one that sees it as having ones rights as side-constraints respected. Are you going for a side-constraints view of autonomy, or do you accept that it has to do with the quality of choice faced?

So, given the current distribution, it may be impossible to organize a “redistributive movement” among the wealthy (without democratic politics involving the institutions of government). But even so, what I say about which principles would more likely be rejected by Scanlon’s contractors could be true and morally relevant (on his theory as I understand it).

In any case, I’m not at all inclined to accept 1). And, I’m a reasonable man. So, you and Scanlon must accept that it’s unjust.

It seems reasonable to me to consider things other than my relative place in some social or economic hierarchy (like whether people’s autonomy is respected to a degree that makes a slide into tyranny unlikely). If Scanlon defines this as outside of reasonable consideration, then I think he’s cheating and the bargain is intrinsically unfair.

I don’t know what you mean by autonomy, but you can find a sketch of my thoughts in this thread at the end of my response to Will. Also, I had this extended discussion with a libertarian reader of this blog under a thread about the “Political Class”. That had lots of talk about autonomy in it.

By autonomy I mean people’s ability to persue their own peaceful projects with the minimum coercive interference from other people.

This leaves a huge range of wonderful, creative, kind voluntary cooperation that lets people help each other without treating each other as means rather than ends.

So, I endorse the Nozickean rights as side-constraints view, rather than forcing other people to improve the choices of the worse-off.

Perhaps you and many others should reconsider.

I don’t know what you’re talking about.

It looks to me like there’s absolutely nothing left of Cohen’s “argument”.

“Also, absent ignorance, they wouldn’t agree to anything that would make them worse off than continued joint-ownership”

But, almost anything would make them better off than continued joint-ownership. Continued joint-ownership is suicide.

Everyone, absent insanity, would welcome the improvements that come from private ownership.

Requiring unanimity to allow this (or even to agree to the disposition of jointly-owned property) is a death sentence to all.

So, remind me why anything from Cohen should lead someone away from self-ownership+side-constraints?

I mean, other than the fact that liberty leads to possible circumstances that some people don’t like.

I think all systems have that feature.

How does Cohen get us somewhere better?