Frankfurt on the Equality Fetish

by Will Wilkinson on May 24, 2005

“To the extent that people are preoccupied with equality for its own sake, their readiness to be satisfied with any particular level of income or wealth is guided not by their own interests and needs but just by the magnitude of the economic benefits at the disposal of others. In this way egalitarianism distracts people from measuring the requirements to which their individual natures and their personal circumstances give rise. It encourages them instead to insist upon a level of economic support that is determined by a calculation in which the particular features of their own lives are irrelevant. How sizable the economic assets of others are has nothing much to do, after all, with what kind of person someone is. A concern for economic equality, construed as desirable in itself, tends to divert a person’s attention away from endeavoring to discover–within his experience of himself and his life–what he himself really cares about and what will actually satisfy him, although this is the most basic and the most decisive task upon which an intelligent selection of economic goals depends. Exaggerating the moral importance of economic equality is harmful, in other words, because it is alienating.”

Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics, Oct. 1987.

  • Rob
    Frankfurt is just blatantly inconsistent on this: any set of rules which made distributional outcomes a part of justice would have this alleged feature of focusing attention on the holdings of others, because the holdings of others will have to be in conformity with the distributional outcomes, so his own view, sufficientarianism, must face the same problem. The critique also seems to conflate the questions of 'how should I live' and 'how should we live' (or in other terms, ethics and morality), because it assumes that a justice-derived concern with the holdings of others must convert itself into defect of personal ethics, specifically, a failure to live one's own life by one's own lights. This seems to me to be a mistake, because there are certainly ways in which I can be incredibly concerned about the justice or injustice of holdings of others, without that reflecting badly on my personal ethics: indeed, such a concern may be ethically good - should such people exist, genuinely crusading trial lawyers, who are definitionally concerned with the injustice of some holdings, seem to have some ethically good features in virtue of that concern.
  • monkyboy
    Silly poor people, yearning for medical care, decent schools for their children and not having to eat dog food in their old age.

    Pay no attention to the rich people behind the curtain, look inside yourselves instead...maybe there's an organ you could sell!
  • There's a small typo: "improtance"

    It could be said that any set of fixed rules, such as morality, is alienating, because life is a process of discovery and refinement. Living by axiomatic rules alienated from life, or at least denies the flourishing of life as a goal (along the lines of Nietzsche's critique of morality-as-against-life)

    Another view might be that morality ought to be seen as an external restriction on Economics thinking (strategies) That it should be viewed like scarcity. A given. Equality would then not be in conflict with sound economic thinking, but a restriction (self-)imposed on it.
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