Comments on: I’m as Free as a Bird Now

By: OrneryWP

OrneryWP — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

Hi - I’m brand new to reading your blog, and delighted to see a subject like determinism and free will right off the bat. So pardon me for asking, but…

Exactly why is free will self-evident? It doesn’t seem to me that Richman sufficiently covers the point.

The feeling of it is quite subjective, and not necessarily extant. For example, I don’t *feel* as though I have free will. My intellectual position (hard determinism) has creeped into my perception.

“The fact is, the free-will proposition is a self-evident axiom. One must tacitly acknowledge it even in trying to refute it.”
Why?
Do we start describing the events leading to the barking of a dog by tacitly acknowledging that the dog was free to do otherwise at that precise time?

It seems to me that the introduction of the nebulous idea of a “person” to establish a free will axiom like “persons cause events” is anything but self-evident. It strays quite a bit from providing as simple an explanation as possible.

By: Marcus Welch

Marcus Welch — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

Quantum Electro Dynamics presupposes indeterminacy. In experiment after experiment after experiment, QED has reliably produced accurate prediction after accurate prediction after accurate prediction. The proof is in the pudding and QED tastes good.

Who says physics and free will are incompatible?

The question of free will is premature. There are no facts that can be explained by free will that can not also be explained without it. Show me an experiment with results that could only be explained by the existence of free will and I will tell you whether the question of free will is meaningful.

By: asg

asg — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

Dunno what happened to my previous comment but –

For a good paper arguing that determinism is self-refuting, see: http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/fwill.htm

By: Will Wilkinson

Will Wilkinson — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

asg, Mike’s argument doesn’t go through without his question-begging construction of “can.”

http://www.niu.edu/phil/~kapitan/power.shtml

By: asg

asg — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

I don’t have time to read the whole paper you linked, although I see that it is about different senses of ability (”can”). What about Mike’s argument is question-begging? In particular, does commitment to ought-implies-can commit one also to rejecting determinism, in your view?

By: Knowledge Problem

Knowledge Problem — Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 +0000

JFEFFERSON’S CARTESIAN RATIONALITY

Lynne Kiesling Will Wilkinson has all sorts of good stuff going on right now, including an interesting post about free will and determinism. But I, like Tyler Cowen, will pick up on his mention of his increasing dislike of Thomas…