We the People . . .

by Will Wilkinson on August 24, 2004

aren’t very smart.

Louis Menand has an enjoyable summary of some of the work on democratic choice in response to Phillip Converse’s classic “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” Converse was the first systematically to point out that very few of us have any idea what we’re talking about when it comes to politics. Menand highlights three theories about democracy in light of Converse.

The first is that electoral outcomes, as far as “the will of the people” is concerned, are essentially arbitrary. . .

A second theory is that although people may not be working with a full deck of information and beliefs, their preferences are dictated by something, and that something is élite opinion. . .

The third theory of democratic politics is the theory that the cues to which most voters respond are, in fact, adequate bases on which to form political preferences.

My own view is some combination of the first and second theories. However, I believe that the opinions of the elite are also “essentially arbitrary.”

Menand’s penultimate paragraph is excellent:

Man may not be a political animal, but he is certainly a social animal. Voters do respond to the cues of commentators and campaigners, but only when they can match those cues up with the buzz of their own social group. Individual voters are not rational calculators of self-interest (nobody truly is), and may not be very consistent users of heuristic shortcuts, either. But they are not just random particles bouncing off the walls of the voting booth. Voters go into the booth carrying the imprint of the hopes and fears, the prejudices and assumptions of their family, their friends, and their neighbors. For most people, voting may be more meaningful and more understandable as a social act than as a political act.

All this raises the question of the moral legitimacy of democracy. For here we are imposing coercive sanctions on people solely due to the fact that some critical mass of essentially ignorant people have happened to decide to choose one way rather than another. Although I am inclined to shit on democracy when given the chance, I acknowledge that it is superior to the alternatives. My main argument for a broad franchise is that it tends to create the illusion of legitimacy, and the illusion of legitimacy lends itself to a kind of political stability that each of us has reason to desire.

In other “the people are stupid” news, the AP runs a story by Jerry Schwartz about voter ignorance. Samuel Popkin, doyen of the “gut rationality” school of political choice is featured here as well as in the Menand piece. Popkin’s view about heuristics are not impressive. At best he establishes that our electoral preferences are not entirely arbitrary, but reflect some non-irrelevant information about candidates. This is not heartening.

After treating us to a fairly entertaining parade of voter incompetence Schwartz slinks back to civics class where Fishkin and Ackerman await to lecture us on the virtues of hanging out in elementary school gyms calmly “deliberating” about the commonweal as local chomskyites and christian evangelicals rip out each others’ throats. My comments on deliberative democracy are here.

  • Nicholas, Exactly!
  • Nicholas Weininger
    This reminds me of a Crooked Timber thread from awhile back-- a keyword search unfortunately does not yield the URL. IIRC, John Quiggin put forward the dot-com bubble and the Asian financial crisis as evidence that markets could be systematically inefficient due to market actors displaying the same sorts of faults Converse describes: mindlessly following the crowd, holding mutually contradictory and haphazardly changing beliefs, going with their gut feelings rather than developing rational investment strategies.

    Quiggin, defended vehemently by Daniel Davies in the comments, then concluded (quelle surprise!) that regulators should be empowered to interfere with markets so as to correct these sorts of irrationalities, e.g. by imposing capital controls. Extensive debate ensued. James Surowiecki brought up, but didn't do much with, the question of how to choose such regulators, and the impact of the choice process on the expected effectiveness of the regulators at (so to speak) beating the market.

    Seems to me Converse's work provides a powerful elucidation of Surowiecki's point, and a devastating critique of Quiggin's conclusion. For the irrationality-correcting regulators must either be chosen by representative-democratic processes, or some other way. If the former, you run up against the fact that democratic processes suffer from a much bigger helping of the same irrationalities the regulators are supposedly going to correct. If the latter, you have to try and legitimate a non-democratically-chosen regulator in a democracy-loving world.
  • By the way, I wrote a paper for an epistemology course last semester in which I argued how well Hayek fits within the pragmatist tradition. "The Use of Knowledge in Society" mirrors much of the work done by James and Peirce.

    I think pragmatism is something libertarians--with the notable exception of Richard Posner--have unfortunately ignored, probably as a result of the influence of Objectivism (as I'm sure you know, in Objectivist circles, calling someone a pragmatist is about the worst possible thing you can say).

    I think it's also a function of libertarians calling themselves "individualists" as opposed to "collectivists", which gives the wrong impression and leads to nonsense like this.
  • Micha, I guess I don't see markets and democracy as necessarily in competition. But yes, we should always prefer exit to voice in most cases. Yet there's a point where the principle of unanimity (the principle of markets) falters, and each person can see the worth of putting certain decisions to a vote. See the Calculus of Consent. I think we probably differ in our estimates of the kinds of public goods the state can most efficiently provide. I'm pretty big government, for a libertarian.

    I like your comment about pragmatism. The Deweyan idea that piecemeal experimentation can solve the predicaments of social life fits better with a Hayekian view of markets than with a Rousseauean view of democracy.
  • Although I am inclined to shit on democracy when given the chance, I acknowledge that it is superior to the alternatives.

    Well, what are your points of comparison? Democracy may be superior to monarchy (although Hoppe makes some good arguments to the contrary), party dictatorship, aristrocracy, feudalism, etc. But surely democracy is not superior to markets? Insofar as a given issue can be addressed by market exit or by democractic voice, shouldn't we always prefer exit? In cases where you believe legitimate public good arguments hold--military defense, for example--and where government failure is less-bad than market failure, that and that alone is a reason to prefer democracy to the alternatives. But I think those cases are few and far between, and I lean toward non-existent.

    It's reassuring to see Menand express skepticism about the wisdom of political voice. In the Metaphysical Club and Pragmatism: A Reader, he seems to side with his fellow pragmatists like Rorty and Dewey who can't sing enough hoshanas about the wonderfullness that is democracy. The pragmatist project should really be stressing the wisdom of crowds and social groups, and not necessarily the wisdom of specific political mechanisms.
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