Human Nature and Guassian Morality
I am anxiously awaiting the publication of David Buller’s Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychlogy and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature(link to PDF table of contents). I took Buller’s evolutionary psychology course in 1997, and I think it was the best course I’ve ever had. David’s amazing crisp clarity enabled him to convey huge amounts of empirical information while simultaneously framing the philosophical debates surrounding philosophy of biology and evolutionary psychology in vivid and compelling terms. David’s been working on this book since then, at least, and I expect it to be outstanding.
It’s because of this course that I gave up on my facile Randian views about “human nature.” If I’m not misremembering, I think an earlier iteration of the book’s tite was . . . the Persistent Myth of Human Nature. I’m not sure if this is David’s own view, but I was eventually persuaded, despite very strong initial resistence, by the Hull/Ghiselen argument that species are not really natural kinds at all, but are rather a special kind of individual, like a very old club.
The members of a species are not members of a kind bound together by a shared essence. Members of a species are more like members of the Daughters of the American Revolution, bound together by a geneological fact. You and I are both part of the club of humanity because we have a shared ancestor: the first human. This, however, implies nothing about our having a metaphysically deep shared natured. Evolution works on selection over natural variation. That is, evolution works because members of a species are not homogenous. So at any time, there is simply a distribution of traits throughout a population. Maybe the distribution is a normal curve. Maybe it isn’t. In any case, the distribution changes over time, and thus so do the traits of the “typical” member (if there is one). There simply is no non-contingent common core of traits that ties us together other than our shared lineage and consequent genetic similarity.
This is why I find the idea that there is a right way to live according to nature extremely dubious. (This is all me, from here on out, and not Buller, or anyone else.) We have no “deep” nature. Right now, in this neighborhood of our evolutionary history, there is a distribution of traits that one might call “typical” in a statistical sense. But this has no more deeply normative significance than would the fact that 90% of us prefer almonds over pistacchios. It makes no sense to argue that we thus ought to prefer pistacchios. People with statistically “deviant” behavioral dispositions are by definition not “normal,” but their behavior is not a scintilla less “natural” than that of the normals.
This is not to say that our contingent, temporary statistical “nature” is normatively irrelevant. Far from it. Our intuitions about morality, justice, and so forth, and our behavioral dispositions arise from within this “nature.” Our understanding of what we have reason to do isn’t seperable from what we happen to be like. The ends we take ourselves to have reason to pursue depends on what we happen to be like, and what we happen to be like tells us a great deal about the necessary means to those ends. Given the ends that most of have, and take ourselves to have reason to realize, together with what most of us are like, it is possible to get fairly stable general principles about what we ought to do.
But we mustn’t kid ourselves. These principles simply aren’t universal, or universally binding, because there is no unviversal human nature. Some “deviants” will find a society hospitable to the lives of “normals” incompatible with their needs. And this is simply tragic, no more, no less. The deviant will either be unhappy or will act contrary to the principles of normals. If the latter is threatening to the order required by the normals, then they will lock up, institutionalize, or otherwise rid themselves of the deviant menace. But it is important to see that although the deviant is acting wrongly from the perspective of “morality,” construed as the system of rules that facilitates decent life among the normals, from a broader perspective they are just very unlucky. Foreign cells rejected from a host body have done nothing wrong; they are just incompatible with the principles governing the local order.
There’s a lot more to say about this, but that’s all for now.
July 31st, 2004 17:34
Will,
Maybe you could clarify what level of human nature you’re talking about.
It’s trivially true that we don’t all share the same high-level preferences.
But, I think it’s also true that we are physically similar enough to have morally significant traits. We’re wired similarly, we have similar capabilities (like creativity). We are more likely to flourish under liberty than under coercion. We can choose whether or not to honor the value and autonomy of others.
Is that the sort of human nature that you’re denying?
July 31st, 2004 17:55
No, I’m denying what you might call Aristotelian essentialism about human nature, which basically says we are similar because we are at one level literally identical — we’re stamped out of the same mold. I’m saying that we’re most of us similar because we’re each a move in the same phase of a very complicated and lenghty game of telephone.
July 31st, 2004 18:13
“Some “deviants” will find a society hospitable to the lives of “normals” incompatible with their needs. And this is simply tragic, no more, no less. The deviant will either be unhappy or will act contrary to the principles of normals. If the latter is threatening to the order required by the normals, then they will lock up, institutionalize, or otherwise rid themselves of the deviant menace.”
1. Why tragic?
2. Is your argument intended to be universal? By that I mean are you asserting that you’re describing the way things really are, or are you merely saying you prefer to think this is the way things are?
July 31st, 2004 18:28
So, what are the consequences of the denial of identical human natures?
Are you saying that one day we’ll be different enough to have to reject what we now think are good universal rules?
Or, are you saying that that day has already arrived, and there are no such universal rules?
Or is this just a consequentially irrelevant point, and we’ll be similar enough to reasonably apply these general rules for the forseeable future?
July 31st, 2004 18:44
John,
1. Because it’s just too bad.
2. I’m describing the way things are, as I understand it.
July 31st, 2004 18:46
Gil, Someday we’ll be different enough . . . but not soon enough for us to actually worry about, unless genetic engineering really gets going.
July 31st, 2004 20:24
These principles simply aren’t universal, or universally binding, because there is no unviversal human nature. Some “deviants” will find a society hospitable to the lives of “normals” incompatible with their needs. And this is simply tragic, no more, no less. The deviant will either be unhappy or will act contrary to the principles of normals. If the latter is threatening to the order required by the normals, then they will lock up, institutionalize, or otherwise rid themselves of the deviant menace. But it is important to see that although the deviant is acting wrongly from the perspective of “morality,” construed as the system of rules that facilitates decent life among the normals, from a broader perspective they are just very unlucky.
Utterly unoriginal. Nothing here that wasn’t already articulated in great depth by Herbert Spencer over a hundred years ago and by his main protoge in America, William Graham Sumner, one of the founders of Progressivism (and one of the godfathers of modern day libertarianism).
July 31st, 2004 21:33
I think it’s possible to find present day universal “is’s” in nature. And over time, those “is’s” might change. Ultimately turning an “is” to an “ought” takes very very careful deliberation using our “reason.” The naturalistic fallacy occurs when we inappropriately derive an “ought” from an “is.” And it occurs very often.
For instance, if we look to nature for the “is” of sex, one obvious answer is “procreation”; we men get erections and the “final consequence” of our sexual arousal is the ejaculation of our seed. And those sperm are naturally programed to fertilize a fertile female womb.
Thomism takes that “is” and turns it into an “ought,” inappropriately in my opinion. Thus, it commits the naturalistic fallacy. I’m not saying that it’s not possible to go from an “is” to an “ought.” But before we do, we must proceed with great caution.
August 1st, 2004 00:09
Rob,
I don’t know if Will’s points are unoriginal or not. It’s interesting if Spencer did say the same thing way back when. But is there really any need for the negative tone of your comment? Why not just point out that you think that someone else said the same thing at one point and leave it at that?
August 1st, 2004 00:19
Luka — because these people think they’re on the cutting edge of “progress” when in fact these ideas and problems are as old as the hills.
August 1st, 2004 03:34
Rob, A professor of mine once said of statements like yours something like, “That may be an argument in Detroit, but not in philosophy” meaning that noting that something is not this year’s model hardly counts against it.
That said, Spencer and Sumner lacked the details of the neo-Darwinian sythesis that give teeth to my descriptive claims. (Sewall, Wright and Haldane would have been disappointed to discover that they had not said anything new, as would, I suppose, Watson and Crick.) The point being, the stuff about the non-homogeneity of populations, and the historically shifting typical distribution of traits, and thus the elusivness of an essentialist notion of “human nature,” is not at this point a matter of philosophy; it’s just what we know about the world.
August 1st, 2004 12:09
Will,
Love you blog. The posts are always intersting, even if at times wikipedia must be open in another browser session to get the gist.
Take Care
August 1st, 2004 12:09
*YOUR* blog
August 1st, 2004 20:35
Well, la-dee-da, Will.
What I’m talking about — dude — has something very much to do with the fact that at root there is absolutely nothing novel or greatly edifying in that paragraph I cited such that it would lend — as is your wont — any real penetration or substance to your attempt at grounding morality and politics anything that isn’t, uhm, well, historically contingent. That’s your historicism and its patently non-philosophic. What you and similarly minded “naturalists” are “up to” has nary a thing to with what philosophy, properly understood, is or might be. Thus your project (like that of Dennett et. al.) cannot be spoken of as really doing reason any great honors. Nietzsche and Strauss have laid out in the most compelling, informed, and beautiful terms what philosophy — should it actually occur or if it did occur — actually is or might be. Your denigration thus of Mansfield as not being a “philosopher” — a very smug, self-serving critique, BTW., — utterly misses the markd and you end up merely hitting youreself in the face. Mansfield does not at all claim for himself status as philosopher, but somehow your utterly arrogant cohorts and teachers DO, something which exposes a certain decisive ignorance presided over both by you and your intellectual heros. Philosophy is the search for the right way of life (usually rendered as the right way of life “according to nature”) beyond any and all shifting and changing historical (i.e. cultural) horizons. Think about that. And note well, I’m not denying what you and other “naturalists” are “up to” isnt’ fascinating, enriching and/or rigorous. I like reading these things as well. But to call it “philosophy” — or to connect it (naturalism) with what you call “philosophy” — is absurd.
What I’m talking about is rather well evinced by considering what I take — again, just to be SUPER clear about this, Will, in embryo — to be fundamental to all later “libertarian” thinking (AND to left-wing progressive, or left-libertarian thinking) following in the wake of William Graham Sumner and his cohorts and minions. And, furthermore, as embodied — to some lesser extent — in other Spencerian epigones, i.e. Lester Frank Ward (a famous contemporary of Sumner’s; a left-wing naturalist [social Darwinist]). What I pulled from your weblog posting is perfectly redolent of many basics which Sumner wrote about in his sprawling magnum opus, Folk Ways (published 1906).
Sumner, BTW., was the most famous professor and dynamic lecturer of the age (and was a longtime professor at Yale). Folk Ways, massive work that it is, is a literal science of society -– in which, of course, THERE ARE NO NATURAL RIGHTS (!). Of course, there are some important differences between Will’s overall project (presented beautifully in his recent TCS essay on Rawlsian libertarianism). What follows below is an attempt at summarizing and explaining Sumner and, through which, readers will discern the great over-lap between Sumner, American Progressivism, and Will’s brand of politicized “naturalism.”
Sumner — I’ll hazard to say, much like Will (wittingly or unwittingly!) — maintains that Christianity must be realized (hint, hint!: strong resonances of Hegel!) in this world; i.e. the “essences” of Christian morality are to be secularized (thus enter: George Eliot, Will Wilkinson, Pinker, etc., etc.). I’d like here to again register my hope that Will has been reading his bedside copy of Twilight of the Idols, particularly the chapter “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” of which sub-section #5 on George Eliot is most pertinent. Priceless. The Use and Abuse of History comes in handy too as expressing how our historical consciousness has utterly (or seemingly?) defeated any and all claim we might legitimately have to anything non-arbitrary standard as a standard of right.
In Folk Ways, Sumner employs a radical separation between facts and values, or (in Sumner’s vocabulary), (1) “consequences” (”facts”)and (2) “purposes” (”values”).
Consequences are simply the world of fact –- facts being sequences of cause and effect which can be studied and known scientifically. The difference between purposes and consequences is the difference of idealism and realism –- or between socialism and sociology. There is a big difference for him between sociology (the study of social facts in a cause and effect relationship) and socialism which is an ethics, an account of human “states of mind.” All ethics are in the mind of the beholder; can’t mix ethics into economics. The only ethics imaginable is a “Gesinnungs Ethik,” i.e. and ethics of intentions. Therefore the whole fashion of mixing ethics into economics and politics is ignorant and mischievous. Ideals are “phantasms” or flights from reality; they corrupt the mind and character. The use of reason is only in the critique of reason.
And so, “natural rights” are a phantasm.
Purposes (or values) are in the brain and “heart” of man which are only infected with human ignorance, folly, self-deception and passion. Sumner wrote: “There can be no rights against nature or against God.” “Before the tribunal of nature, man has no more right to life than a rattle snake.” And if the proper use of reason is in the critique of reason, this presents a huge paradox: reason isn’t itself an exercise of reason (something which is much akin to Hegel’s historicism, or historicism in general). Sumner attempted to answer that contradiction by saying that the real power of ideas ought to be used to expose the powerlessness of ideas insofar as they are abstracted from the necessities of nature. The proper kind of character is one who can stand up to the facts and realities of life. The fantastic character of ideals includes the ideals of American democracy –- i.e. the natural rights of which the Founders spoke, Lincoln, etc., ARE NOT _TRUE_. They don’t exist. If they did exist, then “there would be something that would be got for nothing and this world would not be what it is at all” (Sumner).
Man’s right to the pursuit of happiness is nothing more than a license to maintain the struggle for existence –- if he can find within himself the power with which to do it. If natural rights really existed, they would have to be self-executing; they would have to fall within the sequence of cause and effect; the sequence of determinism that characterizes nature. In other words, if there really is a natural right to life, we should never die. Or nature would never violently take our life from us. But nature doesn’t have any regard for our “right to life” since it mows us down every day. So if natural rights are ideal and don’t exist, then what they really are -– the material basis for them –- is a claim of some men upon other men. That is to say they’re dangerous claims, because they quickly lead to the “finished socialistic doctrine that a man has a natural right to whatever he needs. And the measure of his claims is the wishes he wants fulfilled.” In other words, if you define nature as totally deterministic, with no place for freedom (human freedom or human rationality) in it, then natural rights claims become in effect a claim of somebody upon somebody else. And to call it “natural” is only to mystify the nature of the claim. Nature respects no rights. The only basis for which rights claims can be actually maintained is power. That is, you have as much right as you have power. If you can have someone else to pay you for not working -– and you have the power to extract that -– then you have a right. The only “rights” which man can be reasonably said to possess are rights which have been acquired through historical struggle, over time by the accumulation of power in their hands.
Civil — or conventional — liberty is then the only real liberty which is conceivable on earth. Liberty in this sense is a matter of law, institutions, and of history; and NOT of dogmatism or of metaphysics. These, and only these (law, institutions and history), are the only obvious manifestations of the fundamental and controlling fact of social life which Sumner develops in his sociology –- i.e. of what he calls “the awesome power of the mores.” “Mores” he equates to the German word “Sitten” (customs, traditions). This moral life or social morality — or “ethical life” as discussed in Hegel’s Elements of Philosophy of Right -– comes into American sociology through Sumner in this new emphasis on the mores. The mores are preceded by the “Volk Ways.”
Folk Ways are spontaneously, capriciously, uncoordinatedly evolve to satisfy the four great motives of human action. As Sumner calls them:
1) hunger
2) sexual love (i.e. sex – ha!)
3) vanity
4) ghost fear (fear of the invisible spirits that Hobbes talks about in Leviathan)
Folk Ways are ways that human beings evolve to satisfy their motives. Ways of marriage, of treating disease, hunting -– these are all unplanned, which, by trial and error, groups of human beings figure out. They vary from group to group and within the group these Folk Ways are all powerful.
But Folk Ways, once they’ve been in place for a long time take on a moral status to them. Not only are they useful, efficient ways of doing these things –- at some point they get to be regarded as the “right way” of doing these things. At that point the Folk Ways become mores. They become social morality rather than “utility.” They acquire moral significance. The life of society consists in making Folk Ways and applying them. That’s what society does. Therefore, the “science of society” is the study of the Folk Ways.
But we’re THEN confronted with the fact that different societies have different folk ways and mores. So the question is how do you choose between them? Doesn’t this raise the problem of relativism? Yes, it does says Sumner, but also it raises the answer to relativism. Rationally, you cannot choose between the mores of society A and society B because, as he writes, “the mores can make anything right.” The notion of right and wrong is within the mores or volk ways. And within that horizon, whatever _is_, is right. The notion of right morality is simply a trait or tradition of the “in group” (as opposed to the “out group”). Sumner, by the way, is responsible for these terms “in group” and “out group”; the habit of mind of the “in group” within society -– or powerful hands within that society. The “in group” is always the most powerful group in that society; it sets the moral tone for society. As Sumner wrote in Folk Ways, “nothing but might have ever made right.”
Scientifically speaking, they are no more right than those of any other group -– mores do change to life conditions but the pace of change is extremely slow. The great sweep of time sweeps on despite us.
The only way to rise above this relativism is THROUGH FACTS -– through the study of science. The only non-relative thing is the study of facts. But this is an arduous and long task and few can do this for long and continuously. So even the greatest minds lapse back into their mores. Therefore science cannot overcome the more; it cannot re-shape the mores in any planned kind of way. Only great cataclisms, discoveries and inventions and slow adaptations over time can do this.
So there are no natural rights. But Sumner maintains that there is a “natural law” accessible to our reason. This “natural law” is the social order (which is analogous to the laws of the physical order) and is the survival of the fittest.
No socialist reformers, disguised do-gooders can deflect the operations of this natural law. In the end nature will win out. Nonetheless, people keep trying. So Sumner’s most famous, or at least widely read, book (What Social Classes Owe Each Other) and his other writings seek to show the futility of such attempts.
Man is conceived not in liberty but under a burden and necessity of fending for oneself in the face of a very hostile and grudging nature.
How are men different from animals? Eons ago man was little better than a beast. Man superior to them only in his capacity for organization. (Which is a lot like Rousseau -– man is free, open to change in way that other animals are not; he is not rational to begin with. Man is not naturally rational; he’s naturally free -– i.e. the Second Discourse -– in that he is open to becoming rational. But he is not by nature rational. So man is born adaptable.). Man’s only advantage over savage man is capital. Accidental discovery of flint and fire are what launched man’s ascent from the animals. (For Rousseau it was discovery of wheat and iron). So capital has a role in Sumner’s theory that is matched only by its role in Marxism. But this is not surprising considering that both are a variant of evolutionary economic determinism. To Sumner, capital represents human energy, stored or accumulated. And as such, it provides a convenient measure of man’s conquest of nature. In fact capital is power over nature. And if society doesn’t keep up its capital stock (its power over nature), then it will very easily slide back into barbarism, back into the pre-eminence of nature. Capital has its beginning in nature –- as it does for Marx. For Sumner too it quickly becomes independent of nature, independent of its beginnings, and becomes a separate force.
[It's here quite telling to stop to consider a quote from Abraham Lincoln:
That's Lincoln in criticism of the slave party of the day which held that the liberty of one man was nothing when in conflict with another man’s right of property. Sumner takes the opposite position. Liberty and property are NOT inseperable -– and if separated, it is property which is fundamental and permanent, not liberty, because property represents capital. And liberty is a product of capital rather than being a precondition or precursor.]
So for Sumner, politics — er, “politics” (scare quotes, because it represents an attempt NOT to understand the political as political** — is harnessed to conquer nature to pacify the competition of life and ultimately to satisfy our hunger, sex passion, vanity and ghost fears.
* Mr. Nietzsche:
—-
** It’s an attempt — very A-POLITICAL (the distinguishing feature of philosophized/ politicized “naturalism”) in that it tries to understand politics from the P.O.V of things that are either inherently below the political or “above” the political, without ever coming to an understanding of politics as politics. To do that, one must — ultimately — go back to Aristotle, reading him without modern blinders and prejudices.
August 2nd, 2004 01:13
Hey Rob, You’ll understand if it takes me a while to digest that. But, wow, interesting stuff. That’s why I keep this up. I feel like I’m talking Urdu and you’re talking Ilocano, but sometimes we learn something from each other. So, cool. Anyway, I’m picking up Nietzsche and crawling into bed.
August 2nd, 2004 01:28
I will comment on this real quick:
This is helpful because it points up our key difference, which is that we don’t agree with what philosophy is. We could probably get a long ways if I always put ‘philosophy’ in italics, and you always put it in bold, or something, because we just aren’t talking about the same thing. I don’t want to write an essay on the “what is philosophy” question presently, but, clearly, I don’t take it to be the search for the best kind of life (although that is INCLUDED in philosophy, as long as “according to nature” isn’t smuggled into the very idea of “best kind of life”. And I find it exceedingly peculiar to say that naturalism, by dint of the definition of ‘philosophy’, isn’t a philosophical position.
But it explains a lot if you think that philosophy isn’t philosophy if it isn’t about a sort of atemporal essentialism, while I think atemporal essentialism is one philosphical position among many and happens to be false. So I think you’re confusing ‘philosophy’ with a philosophy (which is false), and you think that nominalist naturalists like me don’t, strictly speaking, have a philosophy at all. Moreover, I guess you’ve got to think that everything I say is sort of a threat to “the best way of life” and thus philosophy. Interesting.
August 2nd, 2004 21:59
Rob,
You, like the other Straussians, seem to be imbibed in Nietzsche. And the message that you stress is that if Nietzsche is right, then there is no objective basis for right and wrong—no way to objectively categorize such horrible things as slavery, genocide (the holocaust) as wrong. All we can do is make impotent “value judgments” against them—but no one value (America’s) is any more rational than any other (the slavers’, the Nazis). In other words, you present such an undesirable case for nihilism that no one would wish it to be true or want to accept that it is (because they can’t handle this truth). But Strauss, and the East Coast Straussians did, after Nietzsche, believe it: He/they just realized that it’s not a lovable truth—certainly not one in which we can rest political orders on.
But, what if it is true? In other words, just because something is unlovable, horrific even, doesn’t mean that it’s false. What is implicit in your posts is NOT that nihilism is false because it is erroneous, but that, nihilism, if true, is so undesirable, let’s look for a way around it.
I am certain that Strauss, regardless of what he may have publicly/exoterically written, was an atheist and a nihilist, that he believed that “no true philosopher could believe in God” (Allan Bloom’s words from Ravelstein, but certainly Bloom parroting his mentor Strauss) and that rights weren’t grounded in nature. And that all of Strauss’s students, including Jaffa, know that Strauss stood for this. This leads me to believe that Jaffa too is an esoteric atheist/nihilist and posits natural right so as to keep the whole system of morality from falling apart.
And with all of your Nietzsche talk, Rob, this leads me to believe that you too could be an esoteric atheist/nihilist. Just a thought.
August 3rd, 2004 00:36
Huh.
Not sure I understand what, exactly, is being debated here.
Human nature?
Science vs. Philosophy?
Nihilism?
Whether it’s possible for the human stomach to digest the universe?
For what it’s worth:
If your argument proves nothing is everything
then your argument proves nothing.
August 3rd, 2004 01:05
I take the lesson of Ev Psych to be precisely that there is a human nature. Human beings love their children; this is so because it has obvious positive consequences for their genes. Thus although there are some who do not love their children, the conjunction of the Darwinian reasoning with the extremely low probability of a person not loving their children makes it in some sense ‘correct’ to just say that it is human nature. One doesn’t have to talk about standard deviations, etc.
With high probability I’ve just read too much Pinker. In fact he called his last book the Blank Slate and its thesis is that there is a human nature and it is universal. (Previously, in the Language Instinct he said something like ‘there is only one human language’, and it is hardwired into the brain). He even has a list of traits that every culture shows (granted culture, not necessarily individuals) - items: abstraction in speech and thought; actions under self control distinguished from those not under control; aesthetics; affection expressed and felt; etc, etc; weaning, weapons, weather control (attempts to); white (color term); world view - but most of the things on the list apply to all people. Many can be understood in Darwinian terms.
How about an example of something about society making it hospitable to the lives of ‘normals’ that is incompatible with the needs of some type (but do types exist?) of ‘deviants’? This would help with interpretation. If deviance means, for example, ostentatious nose picking, I would agree that this, while seemingly universally revolting is not in violation of some universally binding rule. The plucked chickens we will evolve into may find it deeply admirable. But if deviance means rape, human, and indeed even mammalian, nature permits us to see that this is objectively wrong.
(Incidentally, I love how Nietzsche called Comte a Jesuit. Also, it’s Gauss(ian). I’m starting to ramble so I’d better stop.)
August 3rd, 2004 03:10
Hi Will — thanks for your responses. Just to let you know, I’ll pick up discussion on this thread perhaps tomorrow (Tuesday) or Wednesday this week. I’m absolutely swamped right now (work related matters).
Best, ~R.
August 3rd, 2004 11:30
Karl F.,
When I had dinner with Leda Cosmides a couple years back, she was very adamant about evol psych => human nature. I don’t disagree, depending on what “human nature” is supposed to mean. If the idea is that we are not blank slates upon which anything may be written, then it is indisputably true. But the reason I’m promoting Buller’s book in advance is that I think he will usefully clarify what it could mean to say that there is a human nature in light of evolutionary biology and psychology. I’m sure that his book will be rather more philosophically sophisticated than Pinker’s.
August 11th, 2004 14:01
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