The debate thus turns on fundamental questions of political morality, namely an articulation of the requirements of a liberal theory of justice. But it is as difficult to conceive that we’ll arrive at anything approaching a rational consensus on a libertarian theory of justice, which is freighted with any number of controversial normative assumptions, than we will on any particular comprehensive conception of the good.

As you know, Rawls’s answer to this dilemma is the social contract: the principles of justice are those that emerge from the original position, which is designed so that no person’s parochial interests are privileged in the design of social institutions. The resulting principles of justice define the scope of person’s rights and are in that sense “neutral” between person’s competing interests. While reasonable minds might differ about what the contractual methodology actually requires, it is at the very least a powerful tool of social analysis.

But as Rawls points out (Political Liberalism, p. 265), this option is not open to the libertarian, for whom rights are typically posited as part of the natural social fabric, e.g., the fundamental right of individual liberty yields the right of self-ownership, which in turn yields the right to the fruits of one’s labor, etc. How, then, does one justify a libertarian theory of justice without resort to inherently contestable moral claims? If one can’t, then how can political libertarianism prevail by means of democratic (non-coercive) processes?

The debate thus turns on fundamental questions of political morality, namely an articulation of the requirements of a liberal theory of justice. But it is as difficult to conceive that we’ll arrive at anything approaching a rational consensus on a libertarian theory of justice, which is freighted with any number of controversial normative assumptions, than we will on any particular comprehensive conception of the good.

As you know, Rawls’s answer to this dilemma is the social contract: the principles of justice are those that emerge from the original position, which is designed so that no person’s parochial interests are privileged in the design of social institutions. The resulting principles of justice define the scope of person’s rights and are in that sense “neutral” between person’s competing interests. While reasonable minds might differ about what the contractual methodology actually requires, it is at the very least a powerful tool of social analysis.

But as Rawls points out (Political Liberalism, p. 265), this option is not open to the libertarian, for whom rights are typically posited as part of the natural social fabric, e.g., the fundamental right of individual liberty yields the right of self-ownership, which in turn yields the right to the fruits of one’s labor, etc. How, then, does one justify a libertarian theory of justice without resort to inherently contestable moral claims? If one can’t, then how can political libertarianism prevail by means of democratic (non-coercive) processes?

Actually that would seem to be simply a free market, and the “willing compliance” clause plainly makes it incompatible with any governmant at all.

Hold the phone. What does “democratic” have to do with “non-coercive”?

Libertarianism can’t prevail by political means, it can only prevail by private enterprise.

About “willing compliance” . . . What you say is what I used to think, but I think it’s trickier than that because of the funky logic of collective action. There are lot of circumstance in which people will voluntarily cooperate just in case they believe that others will cooperate (and not free-ride). That is, they need assurance of cooperation. Now, every free-rider is going to SAY that they will cooperatie. So avowed agreement to the terms of cooperation may not sufficient for assurance. However, a credible threat to coercively punish free-riders will often suffice to solve the assurance problem.

Now, the interesting thing here is that it may be that everyone is motivated to comply as long as others comply. The problem was simply informational–the inability to communicate a credible commitment to compliance. The credible threat of coercive punishment provides us with the confidence that there will not be much free-riding because most people won’t in the end get away with it. So we cooperate. Now, everyone may have been in exactly the same boat, and willing to comply if others do. In which case, no one is actually MOTIVATED by the prospect of coercive sanctions, people are simply ASSURED of the compliance of OTHERS by the presence of a credible coercive threat. So, we have fully voluntary and willing compliance, but only because of the credible threat of coercion.

It may seem paradoxical at first, but it’s not.

Whether the coercive threat really has to come from the state or not is another matter.

But your solution is no solution anyway because it creates a more intractable public goods problem: Now you need government restrained. This can only be accomplished by voluntary donations of virtue because it’s flat impossible to force people to restrain government. But if voluntary efforts are sufficient to solve *this* public goods problem then there can’t be any justification for using government force to solve public goods problems in the first place.

I believe this does, in fact, work fairly well here in the US, although, of course, very far from perfectly.

I am disposed to unilaterally free-ride, and so are you.

Say the people on my block decide to hire a security patrol. I will definitely benefit from the patrols, my home will be slightly safer. But the benefit does not justify the cost, I’d prefer to spend my money otherwise. So I’m disposed to free-ride if they implement the patrols.

Can you offer an example where you think force is justified to reach voluntary compliance?

“I believe this does, in fact, work fairly well here in the US…”

If restraining government by voluntary donations of virtue works well then why is the effective choice on the ballot between socialism and socialism-lite?

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will’s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will’s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to “solve” public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will’s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will’s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to “solve” public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will’s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will’s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to “solve” public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will’s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will’s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to “solve” public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.

This is false. You are willing to enter into contracts enforced by law, are you not?

David Friedman presents Will’s argument above in MoF. To solve a collective action problem, an investor goes around to various potential customers and tells them that he intends to offer some public good like a damn, but only if all potential customers agree to commit themselves to funding it. Under Will’s argument stated above, these people would be willing to participate just in case everyone else participates and does not free ride. They are willing to lock themselves in to this collective bargaining process.

Of course, there still might be a significant free rider problem with strategic bluffing and so forth, especially when the number of potential customers is significantly large. But it is incorrect to say that you not willingly comply with any such schemes to “solve” public goods problems by force. You sign contracts all the time.